IN A quiet suburb of Virginia, a few miles across the
Potomac River from the White House, an exiled Iraqi general dreams of his
homeland and waits. If all goes well with President George W Bush's rapidly
developing plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein, General Najib al-Salhi, a
former chief of staff of the Iraqi 5th mechanised corps, might be back
in Baghdad by the end of the year.
As one of the highest-ranking defectors from Saddam's elite Republican
Guard and one of the founders of the Movement of Free Officers, a clandestine
Iraqi opposition group, Najib believes the moment of reckoning has finally
arrived for the tyrant he used to serve. "The Iraqi people are ready
for action," he said last week.
So, it finally seems, are the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA and the
State Department. After months of restraint over America's unfinished business
with Saddam, Bush and his senior aides have unleashed a barrage of belligerent
rhetoric aimed at destabilising the Baghdad dictator.
The threat of a massive US military strike at a founder member of Bush's
"axis of evil" was emphasised on Friday by Dick Cheney, the vice-president.
He warned that America would not shrink from "aggressive action"
to prevent hostile states acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Dismissing European and other concerns that Washington is going too far
in its threats against Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Cheney told the Council
for Foreign Relations that Washington would use "all the means at
our disposal - meaning military, diplomatic, intelligence etc" to
continue the war on terrorism.
"America has friends and allies in this cause, but only we can lead
it," said Cheney, who is due to visit Britain and 11 Middle Eastern
states next month to discuss US intentions towards Iraq.
Yet even as Pentagon planners worked on Iraqi invasion plans - and General
Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, shocked many of his European admirers
by endorsing Bush,s views on "evil" regimes - signs were emerging
of cracks in the American military carapace that rumbled to victory in
Afghanistan.
For all the administration's fighting talk about "going it alone"
against Baghdad, senior officials were playing down reports that 200,000
US troops were ready to pour across the Iraqi border from Kuwait. Even
Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy defence secretary, who has led the charge
for the overthrow of Saddam, told a Senate committee: "There's a bit
too much loose talk on the subject and I don,t want to add any embellishments
of my own."
Behind the conflicting Washington signals lie profound differences within
the administration over who should replace Saddam. There is also an unresolved
military debate over the best strategy for ousting a dictator regarded
by many US officials as a genius at self-preservation.
Bush announced last week that he intended to "reserve whatever options
I have. I'll keep them close to my vest". Yet there was broad agreement
in political and diplomatic circles that the administration is pondering
at least four kinds of military pressure, two of which might provoke Saddam,s
fall even before a full-scale US invasion.
The first and most optimistic scenario calls for increased covert activity
by CIA agents who would mount a clandestine campaign of sabotage, assassination
and recruitment of defectors in the hope of either provoking a coup or
at the very least preparing the ground for military action.
US officials admit such tactics have rarely produced results in the past
and that Saddam has a near-mystical ability to spot would-be coup plotters.
Most analysts expect any military assault to begin with a prolonged bombing
campaign - once US stocks of smart munitions are replenished from the Afghan
war.
A fierce debate is unfolding in Washington over the potential effectiveness
on the ground of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the leading opposition
group based in London. Washington seems to lack a local partner of the
calibre of Afghanistan,s triumphant Northern Alliance.
The question facing the Pentagon is whether to recommend to Bush a comparatively
compact assault on Baghdad by three divisions comprising 50,000 troops
who could be deployed in weeks; or to adopt a long-standing invasion plan
that calls for a force of 200,000 troops to be assembled over a period
of up to three months.
The advantages of the smaller option are both military and diplomatic.
The invading force could be assembled on US aircraft carriers and in Kuwait,
and would not necessarily need to make use of bases in Turkey or Saudi
Arabia, both of which have expressed concern at American intentions in
Iraq.
The speed of the build-up would also reduce Saddam's ability to exploit
international opposition. A force of three American divisions - one airborne,
one mechanised and one marine - could strike swiftly at Baghdad, possibly
provoking an immediate coup.
At the same time, the force would probably not be big enough to secure
Baghdad in the face of resistance from Saddam's 100,000-strong Republican
Guard. Any internal coup attempt could also present Washington with a dilemma
- Saddam's replacement may turn out to be just as evil.
The only way of doing the job properly, one Pentagon faction argues, is
to send enough troops to crush the Republican Guard, seize control of Baghdad
and install the INC as an interim government pending free elections. The
INC's leader, Ahmed Chalabi, or a respected general such as Najib, might
be called on to fill what American officials describe as the Hamid Karzai
role - after the post-Taliban leader of Afghanistan.
The Pentagon,s longstanding war plan calls for five US divisions and the
entire 18th Airborne Corps to be thrown into battle. Yet it is not at all
clear that such a vast force can be amassed or protected without the use
of air bases in Turkey or Saudi Arabia.
Both countries have serious misgivings: the price of an American assault
may be a country split into three - the Kurdish north, Sunni Muslim centre
and the Shi'ite south.
The long preparations required for a 200,000-strong invasion force would
also allow Saddam time for "any amount of international mischief-making",
one American analyst predicted.
Washington appears ready to wait until after the United Nations security
council debates a new sanctions regime in May, when further demands will
be made for UN weapons inspectors to have access to Iraq; a troop build-up
through the summer could also delay an invasion until the autumn. There
is concern as well that Saddam, as a last resort, could load his stockpile
of missiles with chemical and biological warheads.
Despite worldwide concern that the Americans have not fully considered
the long-term ramifications of ousting Saddam, there is little doubt in
Washington that Bush is committed to finishing the job that his father
started in Kuwait.
"Saddam Hussein needs to understand I'm serious," the president
said last week. Such comments are music to Najib,s ears. "I hope to
be in Baghdad this year. Inshallah," the exiled general said.
God - and the American president - willing.
Additional reporting: James Clark and Adam Nathan
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