- WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration
is expanding on and in some cases contradicting U.S. intelligence reports
in making the case for an invasion of Iraq, interviews with administration
and intelligence officials indicate.
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- Administration officials accuse Iraq of having ties to
al-Qaeda terrorists and of amassing weapons of mass destruction despite
uncertain and sometimes contrary intelligence on these issues, according
to officials.
In some cases, top administration officials disagree outright with what
the CIA and other intelligence agencies report. For example, they repeat
accounts of al-Qaeda members seeking refuge in Iraq and of terrorist operatives
meeting with Iraqi intelligence officials, even though U.S. intelligence
reports raise doubts about such links. On Iraqi weapons programs, administration
officials draw the most pessimistic conclusions from ambiguous evidence.
Although the Bush administration made significant progress last week in
generating international and domestic support for a campaign against Iraq,
some lawmakers and diplomats question the evidence being assembled by the
U.S. and British governments. Hans Blix, the chief United Nations arms
inspector, said satellite images of Iraq show no evidence that Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein was rebuilding an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
And House Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said that in secret intelligence
briefings, administration officials were presenting ''embellishments''
on information long known about Iraq.
A senior Bush administration official conceded privately that there are
large gaps in U.S. knowledge about Iraqi weapons programs but insisted
that the only prudent course is to suspect the worst. To give Iraq the
benefit of the doubt, officials argue, would be naive and dangerous.
Last week, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice boiled the administration's
case down to a single line that evoked both the uncertainty and the risk
associated with Iraq: ''We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom
cloud.''
The differences between the administration and intelligence officials may
be, in part, institutional. The CIA tends to be cautious in its predictions
and estimates and careful not to overinterpret a situation based on incomplete
information. Some agency officials say privately that they do not want
to be pushed into going beyond the facts to provide justification for a
war.
Not only the facts are in dispute, but also the interpretation of those
facts. CIA analysts have reported that Saddam wants weapons for prestige
and security, not for an attack on U.S. interests that would almost certainly
bring a devastating U.S. response. Bush administration officials warn that
once Saddam develops his arsenal, he must be considered a risk to use it.
Conversely, the CIA says the U.S. military should assume that Saddam would
use chemical and biological weapons against American invaders if the survival
of his regime were at stake. Bush's top advisers view this risk as manageable.
One of the administration's key arguments is that the intelligence on Iraqi
weapons may be wrong.
Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recall that
inspections after the 1991 Persian Gulf War found Iraq much closer to
fielding a nuclear weapon than the CIA had estimated. Now the administration
warns that the latest CIA estimates -- that Iraq may be years away from
building a nuclear weapon -- could be based on incomplete intelligence
and wishful thinking.
Administration officials cite two problems facing U.S. intelligence regarding
Iraq:
* Because of the absence of U.N. arms inspectors since 1998 and Saddam's
ability to conceal his activities from spy satellites, the evidence against
Iraq is, at best, dated and circumstantial.
* Because of Saddam's insistence, on pain of death, on unwavering loyalty
from his inner circle, little is known about whether he plans to use weapons
of mass destruction or merely hold them to enhance his standing in a dangerous
region.
Cheney and Rumsfeld question the CIA's insistence that it can find no link
between al-Qaeda terrorists and Saddam's regime. They accept reports from
Czech diplomats that Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta met in Prague, Czech
Republic, with an Iraqi intelligence officer in April 2001. Administration
officials speculate that the pair were discussing the Sept. 11 attacks,
or possibly plotting to bomb the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters
in Prague, which is regarded as one of the most likely terrorist targets
in Europe.
Subsequent investigations, however, found that the Iraqi officer met regularly
with a friend who closely resembles Atta. Inquiries also suggested the
information came from Prague restaurateurs trying to impugn a competitor
whose establishment was used for the supposed meeting.
More recently, the CIA, under pressure from Cheney and Rumsfeld, could
not confirm reports that al-Qaeda members are hiding in Iraq with Saddam's
blessing. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Rice have accepted those reports
as accurate.
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