- NOW that the United States and Iraq seem set on a collision
course, the fate of Saddam Husseinâs Baâathist regime will
be determined by how well the Iraqi army performs.
-
- The conventional US wisdom is that Iraqâs regular
army will readily lay down its arms, but the Republican Guard may put up
a fierce fight. US experts say the Guard is better motivated, equipped
and paid than regular units, and so more loyal and willing to fight.
-
- What can we really expect? During the ground war in February
1991, soldiers voted with their feet. Few units in Kuwait put up much of
a fight, and 70,000 surrendered during the first day of fighting. After
the ceasefire the levels of mutiny and desertion in the southern theatre
led to total disintegration. In the northern sector, some 150,000 soldiers
of the military units laid down their arms, determined neither to rebel
nor defend the regime. In the middle sector centring on Baghdad, there
was far more cohesion and loyalty.
-
- How can these differences be explained? First, there
was a strong and generalised sense of apathy toward the Kuwait war, as
the soldiers called it. There was still great war fatigue from the Iraq-Iran
war. This destroyed the old union between official and popular nationalisms.
Heavy casualties, poor logistics, meagre provisions, operational mismanagement,
defeat and, finally, a disorganised withdrawal augmented the bitterness
among the units stationed in the south. Party commissars and loyal kinship
networks were sparsely represented in the units sent to the south and those
left in Kuwait. The grip of the party and the clan over the army was weak.
Paradoxically, the devastating Allied coalition air campaign, which had
initially triggered an angry reaction by the soldiers in the south, ultimately
wiped out most of them.
-
- The Bush senior administration had decided in 1990 not
to destroy the Iraqi army completely, but to leave it enough power to balance
that of Iran. With this quantitative approach the US failed to destroy
the troops that were loyal to Saddam but wiped out the rebellious units
instead, inadvertently helping Saddam Hussein deal with the threat from
his routed army in the south.
-
- The section of the armed forces left intact for Iraqâs
national defence carried out its domestic security tasks almost to perfection.
There are many factors behind this cohesion: the high density of kinship
and party networks in the guard, compared to the main army; its sense of
collective threat. This helped keep morale high and lent a sense of purpose
to the governmentâs campaign to prevent revolt. These high spirits
were further enhanced by the relative safety of the guardâs positions
during the war. From 1991 on, the Iraqi regime restructured to put its
ruling house and governmental institutions in order, reorganising the ruling
household, which was beginning to show signs of disunity; arranging a smooth
succession; forcing the re-tribalisation of society; and reorganising the
military.
-
- The looming war is different from 1991 in political objectives,
operational drive and battlefield zones. Politics will play a much larger
part in shaping the attitude of the Iraqi military. As the US openly seeks
regime change, it will require operations, direct or by proxy, to take
the seat of power, Baghdad. If key Iraqi units are not won over or a coup
successfully encouraged, the main objective will not be attainable except
by full-scale invasion and occupation. The euphoria over the swift success
in Afghanistan is misleading. Afghanistan does not prove the viability
of enforced regime change in Iraq, rather the reverse. Breaking the unity
of the ruling clan-class may prove very difficult. There is at present
no sign that the coherence of the ruling elite has been targeted.
-
- >From the Iraqi side, the nature of the conflict is
also quite different; it is now a war for survival, and the ruling class
is painfully aware of the gulf between official nationalism and popular
patriotism. There is also a grim awareness that the Iraqi army is no match
for the US or a coalition of armies. What can Baghdad do? It has tried
to manipulate and accentuate the sense of collective threat posed by the
US to all the ruling elite; the indiscriminate threat of elimination may
unite them in a drive to fight to the end. This sense of collective vulnerability
has been reinforced by the undifferentiated presentation of the objectives
of the US campaign. To offset the inherent weakness of official nationalism,
the regime has mobilised popular and institutional religion, both anti-Shiâite
communalism, and Shiâite religious rulings (fatwa) against the Shiâite
opposition.
-
- This is new. Baghdad is also trying to fortify the cities
as the best fighting locations. This may increase civilian casualties,
slow down or limit US operations, offset the weakness of the Iraqi army,
and help achieve the regimeâs intent to inflict as many US casualties
as possible. There is a careful plan, too, to use the international media
to pressure the attacking forces to stop short of Baghdad. In the desert
there are few opportunities for sensational press stories. In the 1991
Gulf war, the coalition forces controlled the media. Now Iraq seems bent
on reversing that and 10 media stations have been installed underground.
-
- To ensure continuity, a bipolar system of political leadership
has been created: Saddam and Qusay, his son, as the actual and reserve
presidents. A third centre of power is also possible though it has not
been announced: the commander of the Republican Army, General Kamal Mustafa.
To stem any potential mutiny by the public, military commanders have replaced
civilian governors across Iraq. Loyal tribal forces are also to be deployed
in urban centres. These and other measures may reflect the extent to which
the ruling elite is aware of its own weaknesses and of the limitations
of the coalition camp. Based on the 1991 experience, the military on both
sides of the internal divide (mainstream army versus the Republican Guard)
may fight, rebel or disintegrate. The politics surrounding a possible coup
are even more complicated. Compared to 1958, when a previous coup was carried
out, the military is today highly depoliticised. Then, 10% of the armed
forces took part in the coup while at least 80% were neutralised by the
swift takeover. In present conditions, at least a fully-fledged corps would
be required, provided that three other corps are politically neutralised.
Without the co-operation of a considerable segment of the Beijat clan,
that is unthinkable.
-
- Whether or not the politics of the coalition campaign
will succeed in attracting part of the ruling tribal alliance to their
side is open to question. If a military coup fails, the potential for a
civil war will increase. In all cases, civilian loss will be dramatic,
the tempo of the war will be slow and the rise of uncontrollable forces
will defy our worst imaginings.
-
- http://www.news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=101442003
|
