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Intentional Intro Foreign
Animal Diseases Into US
The Threat of Intentional introduction of Foreign Animal Diseases
Into the United States

US Department of Agriculture Report
9-30-3


Biologic Warfare or Bioterrorism or Economic Biological Warfare
 
The threat of intentional introduction of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) into the United States is more likely today than during any time in our history. The current revolution in biotechnology has made the development of biological warfare agents easier and cheaper than ever before. The same technology and expertise that has brought about such wonderful advances in medical therapies and agricultural production is readily transferable to the development of biological weapons (BW)
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(1). Any nation or terrorist group with access to pharmaceutical expertise can easily convert the technology into the development of biological weapons. Compared to other weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons are cheap. It has been estimated that the cost of developing a large BW arsenal is as low as $10 million, compared to $200 million for the development of a single nuclear weapon.
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(2)
 
Biologic warfare is defined as the use of disease to harm or kill an adversary's military forces,population, food or livestock. The equipment required to produce BW agents is now readily available for legitimate commercial applications. Now seemingly innocent pharmaceutical industrial equipment, through dual0use technology, has made the development of biological warfare agents much easier to conceal. The Office of Technology Assessment has stated that the nations most actively working to develop BW agents, although limited in number, are from the least stable parts of the world: the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
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(3) The development of BW weapons provide less-developed nations with capabilities that are just as lethal and devastating as nuclear weapons at a fraction of the cost. Eight nations have been implicated in the development of offensive BW capabilities: Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, China, Libya, Syria, and Taiwan.
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(4) A ninth, Russia, reportedly has ended such activities.
 
The use of foreign animal diseases against the United States would likely be a part of economic warfare. Economic biological warfare is defined as the intentional harming of a nation's agricultural or ecological infrastructure by use of a biologic weapon.
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(5) Foreign animal diseases intentionally targeted against the United States livestock industries could economically devastate entire segments of the US economy.
 
Natural or Man-Made
 
Differentiating between a natural or man-made disease outbreak remains a major challenge to defending against a BW attack. Use of a BW agent under the cover of a naturally occurring epidemic provides an attacker with deniability. BW agents offer a hostile adversary a unique and significant advantage because of their ease of production, potential impact of use, and the ability to exploit US vulnerabilities.
 
Nature has long waged its own form of biologic warfare. The epidemic of bubonic plague in medieval Europe is estimated to have killed one quarter of the population (25 million).
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(6) The 1918 influenza pandemic killed 50 million people worldwide.
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(7) Naturally occurring epidemics have devastated national economies and societies. The impact of targeted BW agents can only be theorized.
 
Main Biological Weapon Agents
 
Many of the traditional offensive biological warfare agents developed include animal diseases: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella suis, Coxiella burneti, Fassicella tularensis, and Yersinia pestis.
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(8)
 
Biological Agents Involved in Bioterrorism or Biocrimes
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(9)
Traditional biological warfare agents Agents associated with biocrimes and bioterrorism Pathogens Bacillus anthracis Ascaris suum Brucella suis Bacillus anthracis Coxiella burnetii Coxiella burnetii Francisella tularensis Giardia lamblia Smallpox HIV Viral encephalitides Rickettsia prowazekii Viral hemorrhagic fevers (typhus) Yersinia pestis Salmonella Typhimurium Shigella species Schistosoma species Vibiro cholerae Viral hemorrhagic fever (Ebola) Yellow fever virus Yersinia enterocolitica Yersinia pestis Toxins Botulinum Botulinum Ricin Cholera endotoxin Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Diphtheria toxin Nicotine Ricin Snake toxin Tetrodotoxin Anti-Crop agents Rice blast Rye stem rust Wheat stem rust
 
The US Department of Agriculture recently identified 53 animal diseases, which are nonindigenous to the United States, and could adversely impact the country's livestock industry if introduced either intentionally or unintentionally.
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(10)
 
The Central Intelligence Agency currently lists 15 animal pathogens as having potential BW application: African swine fever, Avian influenza, Bluetongue, Foot and mouth disease, Goat pox, Pseudorabies, Hog cholera, Lyssa virus, Newcastle disease, Pest des petits, Swine vesicular disease, Rinderpest, Sheep pox, Porcine enteroviral encephalomyelitis, and Vesicular stomatitis.
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(11)
 
Possible Scenario
 
The United States is and likely remains vulnerable to a bioterrorist attack. Our national security is threatened by the possibility of a BW event. A BW attack directed at our livestock industries would have devastating economic implications. Although the direct impact on human lives would be minimal, the fear of a subsequent attack directed against the United States population would terrorize our society. Our vulnerability to a BW attack would be evident to the country and the rest of the world.
 
A hypothetical scenario for a BW attack directed against the United States livestock industry follows. The simplistic nature of this scenario makes it even more frightening. No high-tech medical equipment is necessary.
 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Attack--A terrorist group wishing to show the weakness of the United States has targeted our agricultural industry to demonstrate the vulnerability of the United States to a BW attack. The terrorist group decided to use FMD because of its ease of availability around the world. FMD is a highly contagious viral infection that easily spreads by: 1, direct or indirect contact with infected animals; 2, spread of aerosol from infected animals; 3, feeding contaminated garbage; 4, contact with contaminated objects; 5, artificial insemination; and 6, contaminated biologicals.
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(12)
 
Although the direct impact on human health would be minimal to none, its affect on the animal industry would be severe due to the control measures that would be necessary to contain it: 1, stop movement of animal and animal products in the area affected; 2, slaughter infected animals; 3, destroy carcasses; 4, disinfect vehicles leaving the infected areas; and 5, mass vaccination campaign.
 
A likely course of events might involve follow:
 
* A member of the terrorist group travels to Asia (possible China) to obtain scabs or fluid from infected animal
 
* Terrorist infect a small herd of swine to act as a incubator
 
* Samples are collected from herd and buffered at a pH between 6.5 and 11 to maintain viability and are placed in aerosolizesers
 
* Members of the terrorist group travel to major livestock center in the United States
 
* Members of the terrorist group gain access to major livestock markets throughout the United States
 
* Members spray aerosolized FMD into pens of cattle and swine in sale barns, and trucks
 
* Animal are then dispersed to different parts of the country
 
* Some animals begin to develop symptoms as early as 12 hours after exposure, but initially are attributed to shipping stress
 
* After initially exposed animals have been moved out, the pens and grounds are contaminated and posed to infect the next group of animals to enter the livestock market
 
The biologic economic warfare cycle has begun. Before FMD can be initially diagnosed, it has already spread beyond the initial confines of the livestock markets. Trucks hauling animals from market are dispersing the agent around the country. After the initial diagnosis, herds are being quarantined around the country. USDA personnel are responding to multiple reported suspect herds, and resources are being spread thin. The news media has picked-up on the news of possible FMD outbreaks, and the public is becoming concerned. Misinformation concerning the Food and Mouth Disease in animals, and Hand, Foot and Mouth Disease in children is causing public panic. After the FMD serotype has been determined and linked to Asia, the source will not be determined and the possibility of a BW attack will begin to be considered.
 
Recent Events That Illustrate the Threat of BW Agents on National Economies
 
Some recent events involving animal diseases that help to illustrate the economic impact of major epizootics are the Nipah Virus in Malaysia, and the Foot and Mouth Disease in Taiwan.
 
Nipah Virus, Malaysia
 
Prior to the outbreak of Nipah virus in Malaysia, swine was the primary livestock industry in the country. Malaysia had an estimated swine population of 3.3 million. Malaysia was self-sufficient in pork production and exported to other countries in the region. Nipah virus was a previously unknown virus identified in 1998 primarily in pigs and human in Malaysia. The virus, first misdiagnosed as Japanese encephalitis in humans, caused over 250 human cases in Malaysia, including 100 deaths. In humans, the disease manifests with fever, severe headache, myalgia, and symptoms of encephalitis or meningitis. The case fatality rate in human cases approached 40 percent.
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(13)
 
The apparent source for human infection is direct contact with pigs. Transmission of the virus is believed to be from body fluids of infected swine such as urine, saliva, and respiratory secretions. Human-to-human transmission has not been documented. In pigs the virus manifests as rapid and labored breathing, and explosive and nonproductive cough, neurologic changes, including lethargy or aggressive behavior. The primary control measure was culling of pigs. In the 3 affected states, almost 900,000 pigs were killed. Transportation of pigs within the country was banned.
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(14) Other countries in the region banned the importation of pork products from Malaysia. At one point in the outbreak, Malaysian authorities blamed the disease on a deliberate attack by rival Asian countries trying to slow down Malaysia's recovery from the Asian Economic Crisis of the 1997.
 
Foot and Mouth Disease, Taiwan
 
The Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak during 1997 in Taiwan devastated the island's export-oriented pork industry.
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(15)
 
The FMD that ravaged Taiwan's swine industry is believed to have been brought into Taiwan through smuggled animals, meat products, or illegal immigrants from mainland China.
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(16)
 
The epizootic which first appeared in March 1997, affected 6,123 farms and over one million animals, and resulted in the depopulation of 3.8 million pigs.
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(17)
 
A one point in the outbreak, it was being blamed on a deliberate introduction of FMD into Taiwan by mainland China. It has been estimated that it would take two to five years for Taiwan pork industry to recover from this outbreak.
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(18) The economic impact on Taiwan has been estimated in the billions of dollars.
 
 
1. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
2. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
3. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
4. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
5. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
6. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
7. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future;
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
8. Potential Biological Weapons Threats, Kortepeter, Mark and Parker, Gerald; Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol 5, Number 4; July-August 1999
 
9. Potential Biological Weapons Threats, Kortepeter, Mark and Parker, Gerald; Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol 5, Number 4; July-August 1999
 
10. Kadlec, Robert; Battlefield of the Future; http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle
 
11. The Biological Chemical Warfare Threat (U), Revised Edition 1999, Central Intelligence Agency
 
12. Foreign Animal Diseases, United States Department of Agriculture, Revised 1998
 
13. Nipah Virus, Malaysia, 1999, Emerging Disease Notice, Center for Emerging Issues, http://www.aphis.usda.gov
 
14. Nipah Virus, Malaysia, 1999, Emerging Disease Notice, Center for Emerging Issues, http://www.aphis.usda.gov
 
15. 1997-98 Taiwan White Paper,
http://www.amcham.com.tw
 
16. Taiwan on Full Alert Against FMD from Mainland China,
http://www.taipei.org
 
17. Update of Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Taipei China,
http://ss.niah.affrc.go.jp
 
18. Foot and Mouth Disease Plagues Taiwan Swine Industry, http://www.aes.purdue.edu/AGnswrs/1997
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