- (John Alexander, an SR reader, is a retired US Army colonel,
and author of Winning The War (St. Martin's Press). He is an expert in
special operations, and an advisor on national security to the government
of Afghanistan.)
-
- Casualties mount. Mistakes are compounded. Troops are
frustrated. Progress is made. Yet, success eludes us. The reason is quite
simple. We have the wrong model of war for the global war on terror in
general, and Iraq in particular.
-
- From the beginning, the war on terror was defined improperly.
Terror is a tactic used in the conduct of conflict. Most frequently it
is a tool employed by weak forces against those with overwhelming capability.
It is impossible to wage war against tactics or means. In order to win
a war there must be a clearly defined adversary. And, successful conclusion
to conflict can only come when that adversary acknowledges defeat.
-
- Terrorism is an emotionally laden term, one that is used
to brand repugnant groups or individuals. Domestically the line between
criminal activity and terrorism is severely blurred. As an example, Earth
First, an environmental group that has repeatedly committed criminal acts,
has been denounced as a terrorist organization by news commentators. PETA,
an animal rights group, as well as several racial and religious segregationist
organizations, and even motorcycle gangs have been painted with the same
brush. Some of these people may be criminals but label them as a terrorist
detracts from combating our real enemies. These examples, and others, clearly
indicate that an adversary cannot be identified by such an ill-defined
term.
-
- The war on terror is prosecuted selectively. The Maoist
insurgents in Nepal frequently employ terrorism but we pay no attention
to that. Nepal does not have oil, nor does it impact our national security.
Various African nations experience intertribal terrorism that threatens
their stability. This too is ignored, as Western Africa is not on the current
administration's agenda. Closer to home, terrorism is endemic in Colombia
and sporadically employed in other South American countries. In response,
we provide limited special operations forces, primarily to assist in anemic
drug interdiction missions. Little is done to counter terrorism on that
continent even though there are clear indications of direct relationships
between Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East and South America.
-
- Since 9/11 there have been two significantly different
wars waged, one by America and its allies, and the other by Muslim fundamentalists.
Operation Enduring Freedom led to the displacement of al Qaeda training
centers, removal of the Taliban, and installation of a new government in
Kabul. Through the politically expedient means we bought military assistance
from disparate warlords and supported them with high tech weaponry. However,
it would be a serious misjudgment to believe that the converted mujahideen
were philosophically transformed into proponents of democracy. They were
only looking out for their own self-interests, just as they have for centuries.
-
- Larger numbers of American and British forces engaged
in Operation Iraqi Freedom leading to regime change in Iraq. However, even
with 135,000 troops remaining on the ground, resistance to coalition occupation
continues, and it appears to be intensifying. Actions by the Administration
in attempting to rapidly install an Iraqi government sympathetic to their
wishes bear similarity to the Vietnamization program when we hastened to
get out of that conflict. Astute observers know the proposed solution is
inviable. Like Vietnam, we proceed in an inappropriate attempt to eschew
responsibility for the consequences of the aftermath.
-
- American officials brand any participant in these conflicts
who is not native to the area as a foreign terrorist. At issue is the anachronistic
concept of geographically defined war. Many countries now in turmoil had
their boundaries imposed by Europeans who divided the world up for their
own purposes. Their cartographers' total disregarded for traditional ethnic
groupings and societal affiliations has exacerbated existing grievances
and resulted in near constant instability throughout several regions of
the world. Yet, we cling tenaciously to the failing nation-state construct
and inject our notion of sovereignty to legitimize the conflict.
-
- Conversely, our adversaries are waging jihad, or holy
war. Years before the attacks on 11 September, 2001 Osama bin Laden had
issued a fatwa against all Americans and extolled Muslims to join him in
resisting Western intervention throughout the Middle East. He frequently
renews those pleas. Therefore, the perspective of our adversaries is that
jihadists are simply moving to the battle, wherever that might be, and
irrespective of boundaries with which they never agreed. They view themselves
as mujahideen, or holy fighters, and therefore lawful combatants, not foreigners.
-
- Progress and success are not the same. Daily there are
reports about the progress we are making in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reports
sound very similar to "the light at the end of the tunnel" comments
so prevalent three decades ago. In Vietnam we constantly made progress,
but in the end we lost the war.
-
- The notion that making progress in Afghanistan and Iraq
insures success is unsound. For the past few decades the military has adopted
American business practices that encourage constant progress reporting.
Therefore, in post-combat environments it is natural that they monitor
and report the physical changes and quantifiable improvements. From Iraq
and Afghanistan they report the number of schools that have been opened,
the number of hospitals repaired, the amount of electricity that is generated,
the amount of food distributed, and a host of other factors that can be
measured conveniently.
-
- The basic assumption by our leaders is that if progress
is being made, we will be successful. As we are learning with ever increasing
American casualties, this logic is fatally flawed. It is a serious mistake
to confuse progress, demonstrated by counting material things, and success.
To be successful we must redefine the war so that it clearly identifies
a tangible adversary. Only then can everyone understand the objectives
and know when they have been achieved.
-
- Click here: The
Schwartz Report
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