- Jeff,
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- This came as no surprise today. When I gave a computerized
presentation to the NRC's security Chief and staff last month on nuclear
plant vulnerabilities, I discovered that they were not aware that some
boat exclusion zones are merely marked by floating bouys and not watercraft
barriers like those used at military bases and important dams. The chief
of security stated at the meeting that plants were protected by water craft
barriers. The problem is that the NRC is not going to the plants to see
for themselves as reported below in a short segment of today's Government
Accounting Office report on nuclear plant security.
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- Full report available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041064t.pdf
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- NRC Cannot Yet Provide Assurances That Its Efforts Will
Protect Nuclear Power Plants Against Terrorist Attacks As Outlined In The
New Design Basis Threat
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- As the principal regulator of commercial nuclear power
plants, NRC has an important responsibility to provide an independent determination
that each plant is protected against the threat presented in the new DBT.
While its efforts to date have no doubt enhanced security, NRC cannot yet
provide this determination for three principal reasons. First, its review
of the facilities' new security plans setting out how the facilities will
respond to the threat presented in the new DBT is not detailed enough.
Second, it will not test the effectiveness of all the plans and security
at all plants with force-on-force exercises for 3 years, and it does not
plan to make some improvements in its security oversight that we believe
are needed and have previously recommended. Third, NRC could potentially
need to further revise its DBT as the terrorist threat is better defined,
which could require changes in the security plans and additional security
improvements.
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