- Hello Jeff - I have included below some comments
regarding
the lack of safety by researchers who have reconstructed the 1918 pandemic
strain of Influenza. The research team had been using BSL 4 but, has now
dropped down to BSL 3.
-
- The comments below are by scientists who have serious
reservations about the BSL now used for the LETHAL flu virus research.
SARS escaped the research lab by infecting researchers working on the
virus.
-
- The comments below also include worries about
bioterrorists.
The new letal 1918/contemporary hybrid is a ticking time bomb. In this
modern age of technology, we were unable to safely provide contemporary
flu vaccine. Can you imagine the chaos should this new reconstructed letal
1918 flu virus escape the lab?
-
- According to Dr. Kawaoka, "we have tamiflu,
therefore
BSL 3 should be sufficient for the new hybrid 1918 flu."
-
- Amazing. Seems like they just don't care about the public
safety anymore.
-
- Patricia Doyle
-
- INFLUENZA A VIRUS, VIRULENCE, 1918 PANDEMIC STRAIN
(03)
-
- A ProMED-mail post
- ProMED-mail is a program of the
- International Society for Infectious Diseases
- http://www.isid.org
-
- Date: Fri 8 Oct 2004
- From: Myron Pulier
-
- Further comment on the disease security issue -
-
- In the press report cited in the ProMED-mail post
archived
as "Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 pandemic strain
20041007.2754",
Dr Kawaoka seems to indicate that the possibility of treatment of other
influenza type A strains with "Tamiflu" (oseltamivir) makes
biosafety
level 3 containment sufficiently prudent for his new 1918 pandemic-like
one.
-
- However, shortening duration of symptoms once they appear
and preventing development of clinical illness by initiating treatment
shortly after exposure does not necessarily amount to maintaining
sufficient
control of person-to-person spread to prevent another pandemic, should
the virus infect someone. Even in clinical research, few drugs are 100
per cent effective; and in actual clinical use, effectiveness is less than
efficacy, so that some patients may not respond well to treatment.
Prophylaxis
against illness is not the same as prevention of infection and leaves open
the potential for transmission by an asymptomatic carrier.
-
- Furthermore, oseltamivir has not been tested clinically
against any comparably virulent strain, and potential of the virus for
rapid extension throughout the lungs might overwhelm the protection offered
by the drug, however unlikely that may seem at present. Presumably Dr
Kawaoka
has determined through experiment that his particular strain happens not
to be one that is resistant to oseltamivir at pharmacologic concentrations,
and hopefully there will be no opportunity for his viruses to pick up or
develop alleles that confer resistance.
-
- Nonetheless, with stakes so high, it may pay to return
the reconstructed virus to a level 4 facility... and to take special steps
to secure that facility against bioterrorists.
-
- ----
- Myron L Pulier, MD
- Clin Assoc Prof Psychiatry
- UMDNJ-NJ Medical School
- pulierml@umdnj.edu
-
- Archive Number 20041008.2757
- Published Date 08-OCT-2004
- Subject PRO Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 pandemic
strain (02)
-
- Date: Fri 8 Oct 2004
- From: Karl M Johnson
-
- A comment on appropriate level of containment -
-
- Professor Kawaoka's team is to be congratulated for
successful
recreation of the 1918 influenza virus with it apparent increased virulence
for mice. But if that virulence transfers to humans, I am deeply concerned
about his decision to take the agent from BSL-4 [biosafety level 4]
containment
to BSL-3 [biosafety level 3] after finding that level of pathogenicity.
We have already experienced 3 breaks in technique and containment of the
SARS coronavirus this year. Escape of this influenza strain could lead
to a repeat of history that would be completely preventable if that virus
were "put back in its box".
-
- Personally, I would never permit work with this agent
under conditions lower than BSL-4. The University of Wisconsin and
appropriate
federal agencies should convene an emergency meeting to sort this out,
ensuring that Dr Kawaoka has ongoing access to BSL-4 containment so that
he can continue this undeniably important work.
-
- [Dr Johnson expresses valid concerns about the disease
security aspects of Dr Kawaoka's research, particularly in view of the
finding of the enhanced pathogenicity of the construct containing the 1918
HA subunit. His call for a reassessment of the situation should be heeded.
- Mod.CP]
-
- Patricia A. Doyle, PhD
- Please visit my "Emerging Diseases" message
board at:
- http://www.clickitnews.com/ubbthreads
- /postlist.php?Cat=&Board=emergingdiseases
- Zhan le Devlesa tai sastimasa
- Go with God and in Good Health
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