- The ongoing hand-wringing in Congress by the newly empowered
Democrats over what to do about the war in Iraq speaks volumes about the
level of concern (or lack thereof) these 'representatives of the people'
have toward the men and women who honor us all by serving in the armed
forces of the United States of America. The inability to reach consensus
concerning the level of funding required or how to exercise effective oversight
of the war, both constitutionally mandated responsibilities, is more a
reflection of congressional cowardice and impotence than a byproduct of
any heartfelt introspection over troop welfare and national security.
-
- The issues that prompt the congressional collective to
behave in such an egregious manner have more to do with a reflexive tendency
to avoid any controversy that might disrupt the status quo ante regarding
representative-constituent relations (i.e., re-election) than with any
intellectual debate about doing the right thing. This sickening trend
is bipartisan in nature, but of particular shame to the Democrats, who
obtained their majority from an electorate that expressed dissatisfaction
with the progress of the war in Iraq through their votes, demanding that
something be done.
-
- Sadly, Congress' smoke-and-mirrors approach to the Iraq
war creates the impression of much activity while generating no result.
Even more sadly, the majority of Americans are falling for the act, either
by continuing their past trend of political disengagement or by thinking
that the gesticulation and pontification taking place in Washington, D.C.,
actually translate into useful work. The fact is, most Americans are ill-placed
intellectually, either through genuine ignorance, a lack of curiosity or
a combination of both, to judge for themselves the efficacy of congressional
behavior when it comes to Iraq. Congress claims to be searching for a
solution to Iraq, and many Americans simply accept that this is this case.
-
- The fact is one cannot begin to search for a solution
to a problem that has yet to be accurately defined. We speak of 'surges,'
'stability' and 'funding' as if these terms come close to addressing the
real problems faced in Iraq. There is widespread recognition among members
of Congress and the American people that there is civil unrest in Iraq
today, with Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence tearing that country apart, but the
depth of analysis rarely goes beyond that obvious statement of fact. Americans
might be able to nod their heads knowingly if one utters the words Sunni,
Shiite and Kurd, but very few could take the conversation much further
down the path of genuine comprehension regarding the interrelationships
among these three groups. And yet we, the people, are expected to be able
to hold to account those whom we elected to represent us in higher office,
those making the decisions regarding the war in Iraq. How can the ignorant
accomplish this task' And ignorance is not something uniquely attached
to the American public. Rep. Silvestre Reyes, the newly appointed chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee, infamously failed a pop quiz in which
journalist Jeff Stein asked him to differentiate between Sunni and Shiite.
Reyes has become the poster boy for congressional stupidity, but in truth
he is not alone. Very few of his colleagues could pass the test, truth
be told.
-
- The task of holding Congress to account is a daunting
one, and can be accomplished only if the citizenry that forms the respective
constituencies of our ignorant congressional representatives are themselves
able to operate at an intellectual capacity above that of those they are
holding to account. So rather than issue 'pop quizzes' to our elected
representatives, I've designed one for us, the people. If the reader can
fully answer the question raised, then he or she qualifies as one capable
of pointing an accusatory finger at Congress as its members dither over
what to do in Iraq. If the reader fails the quiz, then there should be
an honest appraisal of the reality that we are in way over our heads regarding
this war, and that it is irresponsible for anyone to make sweeping judgments
about the ramifications of policy courses of action yet to be agreed upon.
Claiming to be able to divine a solution to a problem improperly defined
is not only ignorant but dangerously delusional.
-
- So here is the quiz: Explain the relationship between
the Iraqi cities of Karbala and Baghdad as they impact the coexistence
of Iraq's Shiite and Sunni populations.
-
- Most respondents who have a basic understanding of Iraq
will answer that Karbala is a city of significance to Iraq's Shiite population.
Baghdad is Iraq's capital, with a mixed Sunni and Shiite population.
If that is your answer, you fail.
-
- Karbala is a holy city for the Shiites. Its status as
such is based on the fact that Hussein, a grandson of the prophet Muhammad
and son of Ali, the fourth caliph, was killed outside Karbala in a battle
between Hussein's followers and forces loyal to Yazid, son of Muawiyah,
the fifth caliph. The two sides were fighting over the line of succession
when it came to leading the Muslim faithful after the death of Muhammad
in the year 632. Abu Bakr, a close colleague of Muhammad but not a member
of Muhammad's biological family, was elected as the first caliph after
the prophet's death, an act that many Muslims believed broke faith with
a necessity for the successor of Muhammad to be from his family. Abu Bakr's
death brought about a quick succession of caliphs, all of whom met untimely
deaths and none of whom were from the family line of Muhammad.
-
- When Ali was elected as the fourth caliph, many Muslims
believed that for the first time since the death of Muhammad the caliphate
had been restored to one properly authorized in the eyes of God to lead
the Muslim faith. In fact, upon Ali's accession as caliph, one of his
first acts was to seek to restore the Muslim faith to its puritanical origins,
which Ali believed had been departed from by the merchant families closely
allied with the third caliph, Othman. Ali's efforts were bitterly resisted
by merchant families in Damascus, which refused to recognize Ali as the
caliph. The head of the Damascus rebels, Muawiyah, fought a bitter conflict
with Ali, which weakened the caliphate and paved the way for Ali's assassination.
-
- Upon Ali's death, the caliphate was transferred to his
elder son, Hassan, but when this succession was challenged by Muawiyah,
Hassan relented, transferring the caliphate to Muawiyah with the caveat
that once Muawiyah died, the caliphate would be returned to the lineage
of the prophet Muhammad. When Muawiyah died, the caliphate passed to his
son, Yazid. This succession was challenged by Hussein, Hassan's brother
and Ali's younger son, who believed that the succession, as dictated by
Hassan when he abdicated, should have gone to someone within the direct
line of the prophet Muhammad, namely Hussein. Yazid's treacherous attack
on Hussein and his followers, occurring as it did during prayer time, set
the stage for the split in the Muslim faith between the Shiat Ali (Shia,
or followers of Ali) and the Ahl-i Sunnah (Sunni, or the people who follow
in the custom of the prophet Muhammad). Both Shiite and Sunni view one
another as deviants from the pure form of Islam as taught by Muhammad,
and as such functioning as apostates deserving death.
-
- If you answered the quiz on Karbala in the above fashion,
you would still be wrong. The split between Sunni and Shiite goes beyond
simple hatred for one another. Not only did the religion split, but so
too did the methodology of governance as well as the interrelationship
between religion and politics.
-
- There was a final chance at achieving unity within the
Muslim world. In the year 750, at the battle of Zab in Egypt, nearly the
entire aristocracy formed from the lineage of Muawiyah was annihilated
when the Damascus-based caliphate clashed with predominantly Shiite rebels.
Jaffar, a Shiite spiritual leader and the great-grandson of Hussein, was
supposed to be elevated to the caliphate, thereby uniting the Muslim world,
but was instead murdered by Al-Mansur, who established the Abbasid caliphate
in Baghdad. This final treachery created a permanent split between the
Shiites and those who became known as Sunnis.
-
- The Shiite faithful embraced rule by imams, infallible
leaders who provide guidance over spiritual and political affairs. According
to the majority of Shiites, there are 12 imams, originating with Ali.
The 12th imam, also named Muhammad, is believed by many Shiites to be the
Mahdi, or savior, who went into hiding at God's command and will return
at the end of days to bring salvation to the faithful. With the passing
of the 12th imam, matters of spiritual and political concerns were dealt
with by religious scholars, or the ulema. These scholars are products
of religious academies, known as 'hawza.' In Iraq, the city of Najaf is
home to the most important hawza, the Hawza Ilmiya. Each hawza produces
religious scholars, or 'marjas,' who interpret religion and provide guidance
over social matters to those who rally around their particular teachings.
-
- The Najaf Hawza currently has four marjas, or grand ayatollahs,
each of whom reigns supreme when it comes to matters of religion or state.
The faithful look to their hawza for guidance in all they do, and the
sermons given by the various marjas take on a significance little understood
by those who aren't born and bred into that society. To speak of creating
a unified Iraqi state without factoring in the reality of the hawza and
its competing marjas is tantamount to claiming one will seek to fly without
factoring in the realities of lift and gravity.
-
- So if you answered the question concerning the city of
Karbala with anything remotely resembling an insight into not only the
schism that exists between the Sunni and the Shiite but also how the development
of the practice of the Shiite faith has led to an absolute insinuation
of religious dogma into every aspect of social and political life in a
manner that operates independently of any so-called central state authority,
you would get a passing grade, enabling you to move on to the next city
covered by the pop quiz: Baghdad.
-
- It is not only the Shiites who are bound by religious
ties seemingly indecipherable to the West. From the chaos that was created
with the Islamic schism came a very fluid situation in the development
of Sunni Islamic dogma, with the Sunnis embracing a notion of consensus
among the historical Muslim community, a line of thinking that led to the
creation of four so-called legal schools of Islamic thought (the Maliki,
the Hannafi, the Hanbali and the Shafi'i). These schools produced Islamic
scholars who in turn competed for a constituency of followers. While in
theory Sunni scholars preached adherence to the customs of the prophet
Muhammad, in practice the Sunni schools became intertwined in the affairs
of state and business. This deviation from the pure practice of faith
led to the growth of 'mystic societies' known as Sufism. Sufi brotherhoods
sprang up throughout the Muslim world, each preaching its own mystical
path toward achieving personal growth through the teachings of the prophet
Muhammad.
-
- The Abbasid caliphate, which oversaw this period of religious
'softening,' in which the pure practice of Islam gave way to a more secular
tolerance of the baser concerns of man, was centered in Baghdad. It was
the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 that signaled not only the end
of the Abbasid caliph's rule but the certification in the eyes of some
Sunni faithful that Abbasid's ruin was brought about by the lack of pure
faith in Islam by those professing to be Muslim. One of the basic tenants
of the Sunni faith was the notion of community consensus, or 'taqlid.'
Taqlid was actively practiced by three of the four 'legal' schools of Sunni
thought. The sole exception was the school of the Hanbali, which followed
a stricter interpretation of the faith. A Hanbali religious jurist, Ibn
Taymiya, rose to prominence in the aftermath of the Mongol invasion. He
held not only that the Mongols were an enemy of Islam but that the Shiite
Islamic state that emerged in Persia after the Mongol conquest was likewise
anathema.
-
- More important, Ibn Taymiya broke ranks with the rest
of the Sunni community, especially those who practiced Sufism, declaring
all to be an affront to God. Ibn Taymiya rejected the notion of community
consensus represented in the taqlid and instead professed that a true Muslim
state could exist only where the political leader governed as a partner
with the religious leader, and was subordinated to the religious through
strict adherence to the 'sharia,' or religious law. The Muslim jurists,
or 'ulema,' held total sway over society, to the extent that even matters
pertaining to war were reserved for the religious leader, or imam, who
was the only person authorized to declare a jihad.
-
- During the Abbysid caliph, the term jihad had taken on
the connotation of inner struggle. This interpretation gained wide acceptance
with the spread of the Sufi brotherhoods, which were all about inner discovery.
Ibn Taymiya rejected this notion of jihad, instead proclaiming that true
jihad involved a relentless struggle against the enemies of Islam. For
a while his teachings were popular, especially when they were being used
to encourage the forces of Sunni Islam confronting the infidel Mongol invaders.
However, his strict interpretation of Hanbali tenets were rejected even
by other Hanbali religious scholars, and Ibn Taymiya himself was branded
a heretic.
-
- The teachings of Ibn Taymiya continued to be taught in
certain Hanbali circles, including those operating in the holy city of
Medina. It was here, in the 18th century, that a Arab Bedouin from the
Nejd desert, in what is today Saudi Arabia, named Muhammed al-Wahhab emerged
to create a movement that not only embraced the teachings of Ibn Taymiya
but took them even further, preaching a virulent form of Islam that claimed
to seek to bring the faithful back to the religion as practiced by the
prophet Muhammad himself. Wahhab's movement, known as the Call to Unity,
reflected his strict interpretation of Islam as set forth in his book Kitab
al-Tawhid, or the Book of Unity.
-
- At first Wahhab was rejected by the Sunni scholars, and
he was hounded and finally forced to take refuge in the tiny village of
Dariya. There Wahhab befriended the local governor, Muhammed Ibn Saud,
initiating what was to become a partnership in which the Saud family took
on the role of emir, or political leader, while Wahhab became imam, or
religious leader. The team of Bedouin warrior and Islamic fanatic soon
led to what would become known as the Wahhabi conquest, bringing much of
what is now present-day Saudi Arabia under their strict religious rule.
In 1802 a Wahhabi army attacked Karbala and sacked the sacred Shiite shrine
to Hussein. In 1803 the Wahhabis sacked Mecca, laying waste to the most
holy sites in the Islamic world, including the Great Mosque. In 1804 the
Wahhabis captured Medina, looted the tomb of the prophet Muhammad and shut
off the hajj, or pilgrimage, to all non-Wahhabis. The rise of the Wahhabi
empire was seen as a threat to all Islam, and soon a massive counterattack
was mounted by the caliphate in Egypt. By 1818 the Wahhabis had been destroyed
in battle, and everyone professing Wahhabism was treated as an apostate
and butchered. The head of the Saud tribe was captured and beheaded, along
with many of his fellow tribesmen.
-
- Deep in the Arab deserts, a small number of Saudi tribesmen,
strict adherents to Wahhabism, survived the Egyptian onslaught and began
the struggle to regain their lost power. By 1924 the Wahhabis once again
controlled Mecca and Medina, and by 1932 a new nation, Saudi Arabia, emerged
from the Arabian deserts, governed by the house of Saud and with religious
affairs totally in the hands of the Wahhabis.
-
- To the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia there were two great
sources of religious heretics: the Shiites, who ruled in Iran and represented
a majority population in several Arab nations, including Iraq, and worse
still, the Sunni Arabs, who rejected the true path as represented by the
teachings of Wahhab. The puritanical form of Islam pushed by the Wahhabis
was difficult to export, however, until the oil crisis of 1973, after which
the Saudi government was able to fund the printing of Wahhabi literature
and training of Wahhabi missionaries. In Iraq, there was some attraction
to the puritanical teachings of Wahhabism among the Bedouin of the western
deserts. However, with the rise to power of Saddam Hussein, Wahhabism
and those who proselytized in its name were treated as enemies of the state.
Wahhabism was still practiced in the shadows of Sunni mosques throughout
Iraq, but anyone caught doing so was immediately arrested and put to death.
-
- Wahhabi concerns over the weakening of the Muslim world
by those who practiced anything other than pure Islam were certified in
the minds of the faithful when, in April 2003, American soldiers captured
Baghdad in what many Wahhabis viewed as a repeat of the sack of the city
at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. Adding insult to injury, the role
of Iraq's Shiites in aiding and abetting the American conquest was seen
as proof positive that the only salvation for the faithful could come at
the hands of a pure form of the Islamic faith, that of Wahhabism. As the
American liberation dragged on into the American occupation, and the level
of violence between the Shiites and Sunnis grew, the call of jihad as promulgated
by the Wahhabis gained increasing credence among the tribes of western
Iraq.
-
- The longer the Americans remain in Iraq, the more violence
the Americans bring down on Iraq, and the more the Americans are seen as
facilitating the persecution of the Sunnis by the Shiites, the more legitimate
the call of the Wahhabi fanatics become. While American strategists may
speak of the rise of al-Qaida in Iraq, this is misrecognition of what is
really happening. Rather than foreigners arriving and spreading Wahhabism
in Iraq, the virulent sect of Islamic fundamentalism is spreading on its
own volition, assisted by the incompetence and brutality of an American
occupation completely ignorant of the reality of the land and people it
occupies. This is the true significance of Baghdad, and any answer not
reflecting this will be graded as failing.
-
- A pop quiz, consisting of one question in two parts.
Most readers might complain that it is not realistic to expect mainstream
America to possess the knowledge necessary to achieve the level of comprehension
required to pass this quiz. I agree. However, since the mission of the
United States in Iraq has shifted from disarming Saddam to installing democracy
to creating stability, I think it only fair that the American people be
asked about those elements that are most relevant to the issue, namely
the Shiite and Sunni faithful and how they interact with one another.
-
- It is sadly misguided to believe that surging an additional
20,000 U.S. troops into Baghdad and western Iraq will even come close to
redressing the issues raised in this article. And if you concur that the
reality of Iraq is far too complicated to be understood by the average
American, yet alone cured by the dispatch of additional troops, then we
have a collective responsibility to ask what the hell we are doing in that
country to begin with. If this doesn't represent a clarion call for bringing
our men and women home, nothing does.
-
- Scott Ritter was a Marine Corps intelligence officer
from 1984 to 1991 and a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991
to 1998. He is the author of numerous books, including 'Iraq Confidential'
(Nation Books, 2005) and 'Target Iran' (Nation Books, 2006).
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