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Israel's Right To Recognition
Terrell E. Arnold
1-14-9
 
Israeli authorities typically have advanced two excuses for the devastation being wrought on the Palestinians in Gaza: First, say the Israelis, Palestinian rockets into the areas of Sderot and Ashkelon are acts of war and must be stopped. Second, Hamas leadership in Gaza does not recognize Israel's "right to exist". The Palestinians are frustrated because they have been pushed out of their homeland for more than sixty years, they have been imprisoned in Gaza for nearly two years; they have been confined, selectively assassinated and starved by the Israeli blockade around them; they have been denied any meaningful negotiation with the Israelis, and they are now being killed by the hundreds and wounded by the thousands. Those abuses of an occupying power well account for the continued launch of rockets into Israeli spaces. But what is the significance of the Israeli insistence that the Palestinians "recognize the existence of Israel"?
 
First of all, the Israelis do not seek recognition in the usual diplomatic sense. Diplomatic recognition is a well-established process of individual states accepting a state into the family of nations. It is usually done through a credentialing process between states. It means the government of the entity seeking recognition is accepted as representing an internationally accepted legal entity called a state. That state, in turn, has fixed or established boundaries, a population that accepts the territory and leadership as their own, and a government that accepts and adheres to the rules of the international community.
 
There are three common forms of recognition. One form is "de facto", meaning the existence of the new state is factually acknowledged by one or more existing member state. The US recognized Israel in this manner in 1948. The second form is "de Jure", meaning the new state is recognized in law or in principle by other individual states. While Israel's existence was not yet even a matter of record, Russia jumped the gun and recognized Israel de jure shortly after the US recognition. The third form is simply recognition by the international community of the existence of the entity as a state. Israel has experienced some of each, but the issue on the table is what Palestine must do.
 
Recognition concerns itself in part with the integrity of the entity being recognized. This brings up matters such as defined borders and lands as well as mutuality of relations between the parties. In that respect the Israeli boundary issue has been a confused mess, perhaps deliberately. For starters, Lord Balfour made no mention of boundaries in his famous October 1917 letter to the Zionist Federation. He said simply: the British government "view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" with the understanding that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." Note Lord Balfour's letter committed the British government to the actions of the private Zionist Federation toward establishing a new state. Note also that he assumed that the Jewish arrivals would move in among the existing residents of Palestine. There is no record that any of the Arab communities were informed of or consulted about this letter before it was issued. Israel's right to exist hangs from this thread
 
The next chapter concerning recognition followed creation of the United Nations organization at the end of World War II. Already into the early stages of Jewish colonization, friction was increasing between Palestine residents and newly-arrived Jewish immigrants, and the UN General Assembly voted in 1947 to partition Palestine into two separate parts, one for the incoming Jews, the other for existing residents. The partition model was more an extant demographic chart than a map of the territory (see below), and in any case the Partition decision assumed that already resident populations would continue to live wherever they were.
Jerusalem was to be under UN management. . Note the neat touch, however, of giving each about equal stretches of the Mediterranean coastline and of the Egyptian border.
 
 
 
 
(As provided in Wikipedia)
 
 
In an Economist article titled "The Hundred Years' War" (January 10 issue), the Arabs are blamed for the failure of the partition scheme. However, it is not clear that the Palestinians were even consulted before the UN partition plan was announced.
 
Jewish leadership wanted no part of this, and David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, rejected the concept out of hand.
 
His basic position was that all of Palestine (boundaries still not defined) belonged by historic right to the Jewish people. Shortly after the partition decision he began to organize the terrorist groups and build the military capabilities that in 1947-49 would commence the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. This assault on the Palestinians, referred to by them as the Nakba (day of the catastrophe), resulted in the expulsion of 800,000 Palestinians from their homes, farms and villages into the West Bank, Gaza and the outside world. It led to the takeover of the evacuated territory by Jews, and virtual erasure of the Palestinian homes, villages and farms.
 
The central premise of "Israel's right to exist" is the Ben Gurion conception of Israel. He took the position, generally held by Zionists, that Palestine as a whole was the Jewish national home. The concept does not allow for any boundaries short of all of Palestine. His personal conception, as reported by people who knew him, encompassed parts of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, and it specifically included the southern reaches of the Litani River in Lebanon and the lower Yarmuk River in Jordan. The conquest of the West Bank territory in the 1967 war was, as seen by the Israelis, a retrieval of lands that were considered part of historic Palestine, therefore, part of Israel.
 
The critical judgment to take on board here is that recognition of Israel's right to exist is acceptance of several virtually indivisible ideas at once. First is territorial, encompassing the whole of Palestine. Second is acceptance of the Zionist tenet that all of Palestine belongs by historic right to Israel. Third is acceptance that any diminution of that conception will be totally at the will of the Jewish people, and fourth is that Israel must be recognized as a Jewish state. Finally the principle underlying all Israeli approaches to peace negotiations is that they do not have to concede anything for these concessions. Recognition of Israel's right to exist, with all that implies, is a pre-condition to any serious discussion. It is non-negotiable.
 
The next significant development on this issue occurred during Oslo peace talks. That record of Israeli and Palestinian positions on the recognition issue has been clear for at least 15 years. In September 1993, in the context of Oslo peace talks, the two sides exchanged letters as follows:
 
September 9, 1993
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel
 
Mr. Prime Minister,
The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era...I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself...to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations...the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators...the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.
 
Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat.
 
Yitzhak Rabin replied immediately in very careful language:
 
September 9, 1993
Yasser Arafat
Chairman: The Palestine Liberation Organization.
 
Mr. Chairman,
In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.
 
Yitzhak Rabin.
Prime Minister of Israel
 
Yasser Arafat, as noted in the above letter to Rabin, recognized Israel's right to exist, but narrowly "in peace and security". His recognition did not involve the elaborate underpinnings described above, and in citing UN resolutions 242 and 338, he certainly did not contemplate Ben Gurion's expansive Israel boundaries. However, his recognition of Israel was extended as a real concession in the heat of a negotiative process that ultimately went nowhere.
 
Undeterred by decades of failure, President Clinton tried again in 2000. He closeted himself, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in a session billed as Camp David II. Recognition per se was not raised in these talks, but in the outcome it was clear that the model of Israel as defined in the UN's 1947 boundaries of Palestine was still being used by Barak to define Israel's outer limits.
 
Barak made a proposal to Arafat that he had to know in advance was unacceptable. In addition to refusing to meet Palestinian requirements on such matters as the right of return, Jerusalem or the Temple Mount, Barak proposed a future regime in which Palestine would be surrounded and completely controlled (air, land and sea) by Israel. Critics gave Arafat credit for this failure, but Barak, no doubt deliberately, had made an offer so bizarre that he and Israeli leadership had to know Arafat had no choice but to refuse.
 
The Israelis have tried to hang on to Arafat's Oslo act of recognition without making any concessions, and they have insisted on it as a precondition to any negotiation with subsequent Palestinian leaders. Hamas clearly takes the view that recognition is a concession of value in negotiation and has so far refused to extend it.
 
In reality, Israel's insistence on recognition of its right to exist is a political ploy. Its purpose is to convince the rest of the world that the Palestinians are not approaching the negotiation process in good faith. For the Israelis, lack of recognition is a self-serving bottleneck. It puts down the Palestinians as being uncooperative, paints the Israelis as an injured party, and underscores the often recited Israeli complaint that they have no one to negotiate with.
 
Recognition is in effect a stall, because two parties of equal stature and freedom could reach agreement quite easily. Israel avoids that situation by refusing to recognize the people or the rights of the Palestinians. As of now, Israel has stolen most of historic Palestine from its people who were a mixture of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Ultimately, the recognition gambit, in the one-sided way the Zionists pursue it, is Israel's sharpest tool for avoiding any serious negotiation with the Palestinians or any facing up to the enormous debt Israelis owe the Palestinians, past and present, for the lands on which they are building the Jewish national home.
 
Raising any Palestinian-friendly outcome from the ashes of Gaza appears an unlikely prospect. Israel already has started squeezing the territorial boundaries of Gaza, it says for security reasons. While Hamas and the Arab states had pretty well settled on a possible two-state solution based on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 Green Line, no near term deal appears feasible. Rather, the inevitable choices for the people in the shrinking remnants of Palestine may be a future in Israeli-controlled slave enclaves or a one state solution. Neither the International community nor the Palestinians should or are likely to accept the slave enclaves.
Thus, Ben Gurion could have his way, but in the form of an un- partitioned historic Palestine that accommodates all of its people.
 
***********
 
The writer is the author of the recently published work, A World Less Safe, now available on Amazon, and he is a regular columnist on rense.com. He is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer of the US Department of State whose overseas service included tours in Egypt, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil. His immediate pre-retirement positions were as Chairman of the Department of International Studies of the National War College and as Deputy Director of the State Office of Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning. He will welcome comment at
 
wecanstopit@charter.net
 
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