- US President Obama has sent a secret letter to Russia's
president Medvedev, suggesting that he would back down from deploying the
controversial US missile defense system in Eastern Europe if Moscow would
help stop Iran from developing long-range weapons, according to White House
spokesmen. The New York Times reports that the letter to Medvedev was hand-delivered
in Moscow by Under Secretary of State William J. Burns three
weeks ago. It reportedly said the United States would not need
to proceed with its missile interceptor system, which has been vehemently
opposed by Russia since it was proposed by the Bush administration,
if Iran halted any efforts to build nuclear warheads and ballistic
missiles.
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- The Obama offer reportedly was intended to give Moscow an
incentive to join the United States in a common front against Iran. Russia's
military, diplomatic and commercial ties to Tehran give it influence,
but it has understandably resisted Washington's hard line against Iran.
The question is what the ultimate US strategy is vis-à-vis Russia.
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- New Strategy or new tricks?
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- If as it seems, the secret offer to Medvedev is accurate
the question is whether this represents a serious retreat under President
Obama from the long-term Pentagon goal of nuclear primary-in military terms
the ability of the United States to deliver a fatal nuclear first strike
against Russia without fear of significant Russian retaliation.
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- As Russian and even US military experts have stressed, deployment
of an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic is
a direct threat to Russia's nuclear potential. They argue that an
'anti-Iranian' missile defense system will be deployed in the next two
to three years in an area clearly beyond the reach of Iran's existing
and projected missiles, but very convenient for intercepting missiles launched
from European Russia in a northern and a north-western direction. The immediate
targets of this system are the Russian Strategic Missile divisions deployed
west of the Urals. A simple look at the numbers shows that although there
are several Topols and UR-100s for each American interceptor, this ratio
would only stand until the first nuclear strike. The Russian concern is
that it could be tempting for Washington at some point, to initiate
a first strike when there is a system that protects against retaliation.
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- The 10 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles planned
for Poland cannot, of course, hope to counter a full-scale strike
by the Russian Strategic Missile Forces and missile-carrying submarines.
But the strategic importance of these interceptor missiles would increase
greatly were the US to deliver a nuclear first strike againstRussia.
In such a scenario, the Polish-based interceptor missiles would only have
to contend with the reduced number of missiles that survived the first
strike. This would allow the US prospect for the first time since
the 1950s, for 'victory' in a nuclear war.
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- As I describe in my book, Apokalypse Jetzt! (((THOMAS
please hyperlink Fett))) , the placement of US missiles in Poland and advanced
radar in the Czech Republic are vital parts of the US post-Cold War strategy
of NATO encirclement of Russia and eventual decapitation of the nation
as a functioning entity. As Obama foreign policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski
has repeatedly stressed, the gravest threat to US sole superpower dominance
of the planet lies in Eurasia and the chance that Russia, China and
other Eurasian powers combine forces to resist US domination.
That is what the British father of modern geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder
considered the worst nightmare. In this context, indications to date suggest
that the Obama initiative is part of a clever chess game, intended as a
poker chip in the geopolitics of the Grand Chessgame for US control
over Russia in Eurasia.
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- 'It's almost saying to them, put up or shut up,' one
anonymous senior Obama official is quoted saying. 'It's not that the Russians
get to say, 'We'll try and therefore you have to suspend.' It says the
threat has to go away.' Initial reaction from Medvedev has been duly restrained.
The press secretary for Medvedev told the Interfax news agency that the
letter did not contain any 'specific proposals or mutually binding initiatives.'
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- By anonymously leaking to the New York Times an
unverifiable version of the Obama offer, it is clearly intended to put Russia on
the defensive as to why it is unwilling to join Washington in
pressuring Iran. Russia's president denied the media report claiming
that Washington had pledged to drop its Central European missile shield
plans if Moscow helped resolve Iran's controversial nuclear program.
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- Obama meets. Medvedev for the first time on April 2 in London.
The plan to build a high-tech radar facility in the Czech Republic and
deploy 10 interceptor missiles in Poland, both former Warsaw Pact
members on Russia's doorstep, was a top priority for President George
W. Bush. Washington had insisted, in a dubious argument, that
the aim was not to counter Russia's nuclear arsenal but to deter Iran in
case it developed a nuclear warhead to fit atop its long-range missiles.
Bush never accepted a Moscow proposal to install part of the
missile defense system on its territory and jointly operate it so it could
not be used against Russia, giving strong credence to the Russian
argument that it was aimed not at Teheran but at Moscow.
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- At a NATO meeting in Krakow, Poland, on Feb.
20, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said, 'I told the Russians a year
ago that if there were no Iranian missile program, there would be no need
for the missile sites.' Obama's inauguration, Gates added, offered the
chance for a fresh start.
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- Moscow's response to Polish missiles
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- Medvedev has replied that Russia is open to
discuss any proposal to end the US missile defense plans for Poland and
the Czech Republic but that he would not accept any linkage
with Iran talks.
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- Medvedev had warned last year that Moscow would
deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian
exclave bordered by Lithuania and Poland, in response to
the US plans. The Russian Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov,
now says that Moscow would not place Iskander missiles on the
EU's doorstep ifWashington abandoned its plans to deploy missile defenses
in Central Europe. "If the deployment [of U.S. missile defense
elements] is suspended, we will not start the retaliatory measures we planned,'
Serdyukov told Russian media, in Moscow after meeting his German counterpart,
Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung, to discuss issues of bilateral military
cooperation, including the rail and air transit of military cargo for German
troops in Afghanistan through Russia. 'We are ready to continue discussions
on this [missile defense] issue, including in the framework of the Russia-NATO
Council,' he added.
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- The Iskander theater missile system is Russia's
answer to the possible appearance of elements of a U.S. anti-missile
system in Eastern Europe. The range of the Iskander in its basic form
is 300 kilometers, and could easily be extended to 500 kilometers and more
should Russia decide to abandon the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty.
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- Additionally, the Iskander can also launch long-range
cruise missiles. R-500s have already been successfully test-fired from
the Iskander. The range of a cruise-missile system can potentially exceed
2,000 kilometers, thus making it possible to hit targets across Western
Europe.
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- Iskander mobile launchers deployed in Kaliningrad, and
possibly in Belarus, even in their standard configuration, could deliver
a sudden strike, including with nuclear warheads, at most of Poland. Rapid
deployment, which takes a few minutes, combined with the characteristics
of the missile itself, increase the probability of successfully engaging
targets, especially in view of the fact that the main targets - the interceptor
missile launchers - are fixed.
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- Gates admits Iran 'not close' to bomb
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- The curious part of Washington's latest cat-and-mouse
games with Russia is the new admission by US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, an open advocate of missile defense, that Iran is
no where close to having a nuclear weapon.
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- Iran has recently begun testing its Bushehr civilian
nuclear power plant, a construction project run by Russia, ironically to
complete a nuclear plant first begun by German contractors under the regime
of the Shah during the 1970's. Tehran said the plant, its first
nuclear power station, could go on line within months. That is not the
same as having enough fissionable material to make a bomb.
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- Iran's controvesial nuclear program was cited by the
Bush Administration as one of the reasons behind its plans to deploy a
missile base in Poland and radar in theCzech Republic. The
missile shield has been strongly opposed by Russia, which rightly
views it as a threat to its national security. US missile defense officials
have openly admitted that 'missile defense is the key to developing a nuclear
first strike.' That means far from 'defensive' the Polish missiles and
radar would be aggressive and offensive in the extreme, presenting the
world the most dangerous risk of nuclear war by miscalculation since the
1962 Cuba missile crisis.
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- US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on NBC television
this week that Iran was not close to building a nuclear bomb,
contrary to the argument Israeli politicians including the Prime Minister
designate, Natanyahu make. 'They're not close to a stockpile, they're not
close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time,' Gates said.
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- The choice of a new Cold War or not clearly lies now
in Washington, not Moscow.
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- F. William Engdahl is author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics
and the New World Order (Pluto Press) and Seeds of Destruction: The Hidden
Agenda of Genetic Manipulation (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/>www.globalresearch.ca )
and will release his new book, Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy
in the New World Order (Third Millennium Press) in April. He may be contacted
at <http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/>www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net .
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- © Copyright F. William Engdahl,
- GlobalResearch.ca, 2009
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