- Critics of the effort to talk with Iran-rather than bombing
it-call the results of recent Geneva talks with Iran a major victory for
the Iranians. The picture, however, is not that clear. The collective
goal of the Big Five-all original nuclear powers, the Germans-a maybe future
nuclear power, and Israel-seeking to preserve its Middle East nuclear monopoly
has been to expose Iran to the full force of world public opinion in an
effort to cause it to shut down its nuclear program. On the other hand,
Iran is determined to exercise its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and it has been bobbing and weaving in a manner that would
put to shame the world's best table tennis players. Iran's goal is to find
a formula that will preserve its rights as a full member of the NPT with
as little outside interference as possible. The score at the moment is
a draw, but it is worth looking at what actually could be achieved in this
situation, if the lead players only had the right agenda.
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- The right agenda is no small challenge. Six nuclear powers
who collectively own about 95% of the world's nuclear weapons, and who
are moving slowly at best toward giving up their stockpiles, are seeking
to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. Actually this group would like to
hold Iran to processing uranium up to a richness of no more than 3.5% for
power production, and it would definitely hope to avoid any Iranian processing
up to the 19% plus level required for the small reactor Iran now employs
to produce medical isotopes. Meanwhile Iran, which has no nuclear weapons
and still publicly disavows any interest in getting one, is overtly seeking
to retain its NPT treaty rights, and, perhaps quite properly, does not
trust any of the foregoing group to have its interests in mind.
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- The center of the immediate diplomatic situation is a
US-originated proposal for Iran to show its goodwill and, of course, its
long term good nuclear processing intentions by shipping about 80% of
its low refined nuclear material abroad. That proposal, in turn, grew out
of an Iranian request to the UN several months ago (See Washingtonpost.com:
Iran Seeks Deal for Reactor) to obtain nuclear fuel for the above-mentioned
small research reactor. Iran says it needs to recharge that reactor in
2010 or isotopes needed to treat about 10,000 people a day will become
unavailable. Under the US proposal, Iran's nuclear materials would be shipped
to Russia for upgrading and then sent to France for fabrication into fuel
plates for the Tehran reactor. France would then return the fuel plates
to Iran.
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- This gambit looks good from the outside, because it would
deprive Iran of immediate access to materials that would be required to
make a weapon, if Iran chose to do so. In that sense, the gambit is an
artful preventive strike against any near term Iranian weapon ambitions.
Critics argue, however, that fuel for the research reactor would be much
richer than the 3.5% fuel for nuclear power stations, while realists point
out that Iran has no present capacity to extract the upgraded nuclear fuel
from the fabricated plates. In short, the proposed plan would not give
Iran a shortcut to upgrading uranium for a weapon.
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-
-
- From the Tehran side, however, the gambit cannot but
make Iranian leadership nervous. First, the Iranians have to trust people
who are determined to prevent Iran from making a weapon actually to return
all the nuclear materials it sends abroad for processing. After all, one
way to keep Iran from making a weapon, at least possibly for a couple of
years, is to keep those materials abroad even over strenuous Iranian objections.
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- However, it appears to be a happy coincidence that (according
to the above-cited Post article) the amount of fuel the Iranians are being
asked to send abroad would upgrade to about the amount needed to recharge
the Tehran reactor. Thus, if the whole set of transactions actually transpires,
this would be a win-win for everybody concerned. If it chose to pursue
that goal, Iran would have to start over to build the stock of refined
uranium needed to make a bomb. Analysts estimate it could take a minimum
of two years to turn that situation around, assuming Iran wanted to do
that.
-
- Iran's basic problem is that the West and Israel continue
to insist it must prove a negative. So long as Iran continues to exercise
its treaty right to refine nuclear fuel to the level required for power
production, as would be the case with any other country refining uranium,
that activity leaves open the risk that the country-if it had the necessary
technology-could go on refining upward to weapons grade. This leaves the
matter of intent squarely on the table; and under continuous pressure from
Israel-along with threats of bombing Iranian nuclear facilities-Iran is
hard pressed to assure that it has no intent to make a bomb.
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- The Iranian quandary underscores basic flaws in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under that treaty (see Articles III, IV and VI)
every non-nuclear member state has the inalienable right to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That includes
the right to process nuclear material for power generation. The treaty
does not require any interested member state to certify that it has no
intention of refining uranium up to weapons grade. On the other hand,
neither does the treaty require the nuclear member states to actually get
rid of their weapons-or specify a timetable for doing so-- before they
try to prevent any present non-nuclear member state from acquiring a weapon.
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- Those treaty flaws underlie the present ironic situation
of attempted treaty enforcement by states whose own programs ignore treaty
requirements. The situation is by no means helped by recent US agreement
to supply India with new generation nuclear technology, while India continues
to further develop its nuclear weapons program in another room.
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- Various thinkers about this problem see no solution other
than declaration of a Middle East nuclear free zone. That would include
rigorous enforcement of NPT rules for all present non-nuclear states, but
the real hard part would be persuading Israel to give up its nuclear weapons
stockpile (estimated at 200 or more weapons). Israel would also have to
give up related delivery systems as well as technology contained at its
Dimona nuclear facility and (ordinary prudence would suggest) probably
elsewhere. Unless the other nuclear states lead the way by disposing of
their nuclear weapons stockpiles, the prospects of such a nuclear free
zone are close to zero. Even if others gave up their weapons, the Israelis
appear a very likely holdout since they have made so many enemies in the
region by their inhuman treatment of the Palestinians.
-
- One obvious lesson of this situation must be recognition
that the present approaches to enforcing the NPT are simply not sustainable.
Non-nuclear states signed on to the NPT on the understanding, written into
the treaty, that nuclear states would give up their weapons. In fairness,
that commitment is preconditional to enduring observance of the treaty
by non-nuclear powers. However, delays in any observable movement of the
nuclear powers to deliver on that commitment have borne witness to the
birth of four additional nuclear states (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North
Korea). Significantly, the emergence of new nuclear weapons states (who
are not members of the NPT) has not inspired the Big Five to reduce their
stockpiles. Instead, currently the United States and most likely all the
other four are engaged on upgrades and improvements. In this process, creeping
proliferation has become the pattern, and leading NPT members are the worst
offenders.
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- Where NPT enforcement is concerned, it would be bad enough
to face the double standard that some say exist. But the standard is not
merely double; it is closer to anything goes. A double standard was built
into the NPT, because it codified a starting situation of five nuclear
weapons powers, who would give up their weapons if not on a defined schedule,
and a commitment of all other members not to acquire weapons. Israel, India
and Pakistan, in roughly that order, became nuclear weapons powers outside
the NPT. Israel has operated mostly under the radar, finding it useful
to let others know it has weapons to enforce a deterrent strategy, but
not openly admitting it. South Africa, having helped Israel, inter alia
by providing a place to conduct tests, developed weapons but gave them
up as more trouble than they were worth. As a minor nuclear power, with
maybe two weapons of uncertain quality, North Korea remains a non-NPT pariah.
It appears likely that all present nuclear powers are working to refine/improve
their stockpiles. In that respect, the NPT is in some jeopardy.
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- Failing to shut down Iran's nuclear program by NPT devices,
the US recently made public an effort it has been pursuing for at least
a year to shut off transfers of money to Iran from the US. The US says
that the Alavi Foundation, founded during the rule of the US-allied Shah
of Iran, Alavi has been "laundering" and sending it to Iran.
That actually means that Alavi may have been sending money to intermediaries
in such countries as Dubai, Canada or the UK from which it would be sent
on to Iran. Use of the term, "laundering" is intended to suggest
the money itself is illegal, but it probably is as clean as any money sent
by a New York Diocese to the Vatican. As part of its effort to squeeze
Iran, the US has passed laws against direct transfers. Having this gambit
go public could suggest that the United States is really not serious about
diplomatic negotiations with Iran.
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- The solution to this problem requires real discipline
on all sides. On the one hand, to be persuasive the nuclear powers have
to get on with movements toward meeting their treaty obligations. A
new START (strategic arms reduction treaty) between Russia and the US would
be such a move. If the nuclear powers don't do something like this, they
will go on enticing new states to try to make the grade.
-
- On the other hand, it is time to clean up the approach
to Iran. Trying to force that country by a combination of sanctions and
military threats to give up its nuclear program has only made matters worse.
In fairness, the only way to be persuasive on that front is to deal even-handedly
with Iran. Step one would be to get rid of sanctions, then offer to walk
with Iran through full development of power production fuel grade refining
and nuclear power station development. The quid pro quo would be that
Iran operates in a fully transparent atmosphere of compliance with IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) surveillance rules. Confrontation
simply has not worked. Cooperation has a chance if it is honestly tried
with respect for Iranian needs and concerns. Simply put, present strategies
are more likely to terminate Israel's regional nuclear monopoly than they
are to preserve it.
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- In the meantime, no one in the nuclear club seems concerned
about how Iran, under siege by major nuclear powers, might react to a continuing
pattern of threats, including risks of annihilation. In effect, the situation
is a virtual self-fulfilling prophecy. To protect itself, Iran must persistently
look, actually be dangerous enough to do great harm to any attacker. That
means it must spend a fair amount of leadership time and attention, as
well as big chunks of the public treasury, to assure it can withstand an
attack by any of the visibly threatening states and still do serious harm
to them.
-
- Ironically, the thrust of American-read Israeli interest-centered-policy
is to force Iran to arm itself as well as it can. AIPAC (the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee) Is now supporting-most likely created-the
Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, referred to as the Berman bill ("drafted"
by Congressman Howard Berman of California) which would authorize severe
sanctions against Iran. The goal of that bill, now headed for the House
floor, is to "persuade" Iran to give up its as yet unproven nuclear
weapons program. The strategy of this bill, now cosponsored by more than
300 house members is to further harass the Iranian people, even though
that has gone nowhere for decades. Israel's frequently asserted hostility
and suggestive military maneuvers can only reinforce Iran's efforts to
protect itself.
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- The result of such approaches is that American interests
and policies toward the Middle East and Central Asia are afloat in a sea
of unrealistic Israeli ambitions. For decades the Israeli target was Iraq,
and the US invested more than 50,000 wounded, traumatized and killed
Americans to bring the target down. Bringing down Iraq, however, only succeeded
in shifting the focus to Iran. Despite increasing threats and covert operations
against it, Iran has managed to walk softly, avoiding major mistakes while
increasing the size and number of sticks in its armory.
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- The outcome so far is a pair of frustrated Israeli and
American attack dogs. Perhaps someone is capable of designing a more deliberately
destructive policy than this. Ordinarily Machiavellian impulses won't do
the job, however, because the creator of the Prince was not prone to self-destructive
gestures. Updated to the nuclear age, Machiavelli probably would say that
Washington was right to advise us against such foreign entanglements. Nuclear
weapons don't change the nature of the problem; they only heighten the
consequences of failure.
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- ***************
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- The writer is the author of the recently published work,
A World Less Safe, now available on Amazon, and he is a regular columnist
on rense.com. He is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer of the US
Department of State whose overseas service included tours in Egypt, India,
Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil. His immediate pre-retirement positions
were as Chairman of the Department of International Studies of the National
War College and as Deputy Director of the State Office of Counter Terrorism
and Emergency Planning. He will welcome comment at
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