- Social Basis of Imperial Politics
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- Almost all theories of contemporary imperialism lack
any but the crudest sociological analyses of the classes and political
character of the governing groups which direct the imperial state and its
polices. The same is true about the theorizing of the imperial state which
is largely devoid of institutional analyses.
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- Most theorists resort to a form of economic reductionism
in which 'investments', 'trade', 'markets' are presented as ahistorical
disembodied entities comparable across space and time. The changing nature
of the leading classes are accounted for by general categories such as
"finance", "manufacturing", "banking", "service"
without any specific analysis of the variable nature and sources of financial
wealth (illegal drug trade, money laundering, real estate speculation,
etc.).
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- The shifts in the political and economic orientation
of governing capitalist politicians, resulting in linkages with different
capitalist/imperialist centers, which have major consequences in the configuration
of world power, are glossed over in favor of abstract accounts of statistical
shifts of economic indicators measuring capital flows.
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- Imperial theorizing totally ignores the role of non-economic
socio-political power configurations in shaping imperial policy, over and
against major economic institutions like MNC, up to and including major
military commitments. The role of zionist power configurations and militarist
ideologues in shaping US Middle East policy (2000-2010) is a crucial consideration
in discussing contemporary imperialism in theory and practice.
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- Imperial impacts are largely determined by the kinds
of imperial states (predominantly economic or military and the sub categories
of each), the kind of "targeted" or "host" state (neo-liberal
run by collaborators, bourgeois nationalist "partners", nationalist-statist
adversaries) the kinds of policies on foreign capital inflows (sectors
open, content and joint-venture rules, technology transfers, financial
controls) as well as on capital and profit outflows (tax on profits, time
constraints on buy and sell of stocks/bonds).
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- The issue of imperial domination is not based so much
on how much capital flows from imperial countries. Rather it is based
on class relation: between imperial and domestic classes. Different imperial
classes (bankers, manufacturers etc) must compete with other imperial classes
as well as domestic state and private capitalist classes. These multiple
class relations are changing over time to the degree that the host state
insists on transfers of technological, management and marketing know how.
"Domination" or "dependence" is not a structural feature
embedded over time. Insofar as learning by the "host" country
leads to upgrading of productivity, access to world markets and increased
competitiveness based on technological innovations. This results in qualitative
changes in the relations between established imperial and emerging capitalist
states.
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- Hence imperial theorizing which focuses only on imperial
outflows and inflows of capital as if the "host" country
was a 'blank factor' cannot account for the dynamic growth (or stagnation)
of host countries with large scale, long term relations with imperial economies.
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- Emerging and World Powers
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- Can "emerging countries" whose dynamic growth
is based primarily on the export of agro-mineral products sustain their
expansion over time and avoid the volatility associated with past cyclical
patterns? Can high demand and prices for commodity exports be sustained
by ever growing Asian (Chinese) demands? Are the earnings and revenues
accruing to agro-mineral export states having "spread effects"
beyond the "enclaves" directly engaged in producing transporting
and exporting commodities? Are the emerging states adding value to raw
material exports, processing agricultural commodities, industrializing
minerals, developing technology and upgrading skills? Are they developing
marketing know-how, professional managers who retain and invest revenues
productively?
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- Are they diversifying their economies, markets and exports?
Are their exports financing the development of the home market, lessening
vulnerability to external market fluctuations? Is growth overly dependent
on investments and exports at the expense of social consumption and the
domestic market? Are state revenues from commodity exports secured at
the expense of local industry? Is a local comprador class of importers
and retailers, financiers and creditors of local consumers, creating a
"power complex" which erodes the influence of local large, medium
and small scale producers? Is access to overseas markets for commodities,
secured at the expense of local manufacturers? Do agro-exporters undermine
local food production, increase the need for food imports, augmenting food
insecurity?
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- The dynamic growth of the emerging agro-mineral export
countries has been combined with relatively high interest rates. In the
context of economic crises, low interest rates in the imperial countries
has led to the large scale influx of speculative funds into the local bond
market of emerging economies. This has fueled a speculative bubble and
overvaluation of the local currency, undermining the export competitiveness
of local industrialists.
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- Imperial Power in Latin America
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- Most discussions of US imperial power in Latin America
are impressionistic, superficial and anecdotal, relying on particular events,
devoid of any comparative historical perspective. The general tendency
in recent years has been to emphasize the 'downside' or decline of US power,
without reference to specific political time frames or issue areas.
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- In this section we will raise a number of methodological
and measurement problems that point to the complexity accompanying any
estimate of the power of the US empire in Latin America. We will then
identify the principle tendencies with regard to the direction of imperial
power and conclude by providing an interpretation of the complex shifts
over time and location.
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- Determining the direction of imperial power rising
or declining depends on the comparative historical time frame as
well as the type of indicators.
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- If for example, one compares US imperial power in Latin
America between 1990-99 to 2000-2010 on a broad range of issues, including
ideology, client regimes, market shares, economic policies, foreign policy
alignments, there is no doubt that a sharp decline of US hegemony has taken
place. However, if one examines a shorter time frame, comparing 2000-2005
to 2006-2010, an argument can be made that by certain measures, the US
has stopped its decline and may have recovered relative influence.
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- For example, between 2000-2005 major popular upheavals
and mass mobilizations took place, overthrowing incumbent neo-liberal client
regimes, calling for the renationalization of privatized firms, the renunciation
of the foreign debt, radical agrarian reforms and income redistribution.
Neo-liberal ideology was totally discredited and US foreign policy was
subject to a thorough discredit. Anti-imperialist, if not anti-capitalist
ideology held sway among broad sectors of the working, middle and even
elements of the political class.
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- This radical moment however, did not lead to a break
with the capitalist system. Instead a series of 'center-left' regimes
took power and, favored by extraordinarily high commodity prices, proceeded
to stimulate an economic recovery, and a marked improvement in social conditions.
These policies led to the de-radicalization of the social movements and
a modicum of normalization of relations with Washington, albeit with greater
autonomy.
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- If between 20002005 Washington 'lost' collaborator
clients in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and
faced strong opposition throughout the region, between 2006-2010, Washington
retained or regained clients in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia,
Peru and Chile. Equally important the center-left regimes stabilized capitalism
and blocked any move to reverse privatized firms. They weakened independent
class based movements which threatened radical changes. They moved the
political-economic spectrum to the 'center'. Furthermore, the disarray
and retreat of pro-US rightwing parties of the 2000-2005 period was replaced
by a recovery and regroupment in Bolivia, Venezuela and elsewhere.
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- Using regime composition and alignment as a measure,
Washington's decline of 2000-2005 was contained and even to a degree reversed
by the end of the decade.
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- However, when we turn to economic indicators, such as
free trade agreements, market shares, trading and investment partnerships,
the decline of US accelerated throughout the decade. By 2010 Asia, especially
China, replaced the US as the major market for Brazil, Argentina, Peru
and Chile as well as encroaching on US primacy throughout Latin America.
If we examine patterns of regional integration a similar decline in US
hegemony is apparent in the growth of inter-regional trade and political
associations: UNASUR an association of Latin American countries eclipses
the US dominated OAS. MERCOSUR, ALBA and other intra-Latin American free
trade organizations expand at the expense of US centered 'free trade' projects.
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- In the area of military influence and political intervention,
the US collaborators suffered major setbacks in coup efforts in Venezuela
(2002, 2003), Bolivia 2008, but were successful in Honduras 2009. The
US secured a base agreement with Colombia a major potential military ally
against Venezuela in 2009. However, with a change in President in 2010,
Washington suffered a partial setback with the reconciliation between President
Chavez and Santos. Lucrative $8 billion dollar trade agreements with Venezuela
trumped Colombia's military base agreements with Washington.
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- Several propositions about US imperial power in Latin
America can be outlined.
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- US decline in economic power is structural and irreversible,
at least given the state of the world economy and the dynamic growth of
Asia.
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- US political influence exhibits a great deal of fluidity,
depending on the levels and intensity of the class struggle and most important
the success or failures of the incumbent regimes in combining growth and
increased living standards.
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- US military power does not translate into political influence
and increased market shares, especially where the guiding ideology ("neo-liberalism"
or "US-centered economic strategies") and its local advocates
have been discredited because of severe economic crises.
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- The decline of US imperial power has not led to an increase
in the influence of the working class or other exploited classes: a dynamic
"national" capitalist class is the prime mover and beneficiary
of the loss of US influence.
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- The rise of a dynamic relatively independent capitalist
class has not broken with the colonial international division of labor;
rather the dynamism of this class is a product of the intensification and
extension of primary product exploitation and exports. The new dynamism
is derived from the revenues from high prices and expanding export markets
and here lies future vulnerability if prices decline.
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- "Structural" analysis which underlies most
theorizing about imperialism overlooks the important contingencies and
class agencies which put into motion the organizational and institutional
forms of capital accumulation.
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- An Interpretation of the Problematical Status of Imperial
Power In Latin America
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- The poverty of class analysis of imperial power among
the leading and best known theorists, underlies their superficial understanding
of complex changes and continuities in US-Latin American relations.
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- The 'fluidity' found in the countervailing tendencies
in imperial power is illustrated by the relative economic decline in the
present decade and continued military hegemony in the same period. This
can be best understood by the fact that there have been no changes in the
mode of production in the hemisphere, no reversals in the wholesale privatizations
of the 1990's and the continuation of free trade practices. Given these
continuities, US imperial policymakers retain a presence, albeit reduced,
close collaborators in important economic sectors and are potentially in
a position to reverse the current decline. Equally important the US is
still the principle economic power in the hemisphere even as its ability
to exercise 'dollar diplomacy' has diminished.
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- Secondly, while politically Washington can no longer
dictate policy or easily pursue military intervention, the basic military
linkages remain intact, including joint military exercises, sales and training
programs, thus providing important points of leverage in limiting radical
(but not reformist) changes.
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- Thirdly, the growth of autonomous political action and
an independent foreign policy in Latin America, is to an uncertain degree,
dependent on personalities in power. It is not clear to what degree the
institutional bases to sustain the current course of action is firmly entrenched
or based on merely 'conjunctural' circumstances.
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- Fourthly, Latin America's current growing affluence,
high growth rates and relative independence is to a large extent based
on a 'colonial division of labor', mainly trade and investments in agro-mineral
products and the importation of finished, intermediate and capital goods.
Historically, this has been subject to great volatility in demand and
prices.
- Taken together these historical continuities argue for
greater caution in assuming a permanent shift in imperial power relations
with Latin America.
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- Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons to consider
the decline in US power as a long term and irreversible trend. Among the
most important structural considerations is the embedded military-zionist
power configuration which dictates continuing wars which bankrupt the treasury,
devalue the currency and undermine any effort to project economic power
and new initiatives to recover market shares in Latin America.
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- Secondly, the new dynamic capitalist centers in Asia
are firmly established, growing and defining a multi-polar economic world.
They have established in the minds of Latin American policymakers and
ruling classes a new 'world view': Their future interests lie in Asia.
As a consequence of this fact Latin America's rulers have reoriented the
direction of trade and investment, away from the US.
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- Thirdly, there are no signs of any reversal of the decline
of US manufacturing; nor has Washington demonstrated any capacity to curtail
the trade and budget deficits. Washington lacks the capacity to challenge,
subvert or co-opt the emerging capitalist power configuration which underpins
Latin America's independent politics.
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- Summary
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- The 'fluidity' of US power relations with Latin America
is a product of the continuities and changes in Latin America. Past hegemony
continues to weigh heavy, but the future augurs a continued decline. The
current balance of power will however be determined by shifts in world
markets, in which the US is destined to play a lesser role. Hence the
greater probability of more divergences in policy, barring major breakdowns
within Latin America.
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