- Hello Jeff - The FBI hounded Dr. Ivins to his death and
for what? Now, the scientific report finds the so-called 'evidence' against
Dr. Ivins is not definitive. This means the feds will be seeking out a
new candidate for "Public Enemy #1" .... the anthrax attacker.
-
- I hope the FBI has learned its lesson and will not persecute
a person of interest. Dr. Ivins was a bit quirky but that did not mean
he was the anthrax attacker.
-
- Please do check out the links at the bottom of the report,
such as
- http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/
- 2011/02/who-was-the-anthrax-attacker-s.html
-
- Patty
-
- Date: Tue 15 Feb 2011
- Source: National Research Council (NRC) of the National
Academies,
- The National Academies Press [edited]
- http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13098
-
-
- Copies may be purchased from that site. There is also
the recording there of the 65-minute 15 Feb 2011 press meeting. - Mod.MHJ
-
- Review of the scientific approaches used during the FBI's
investigation of the 2001 anthrax letters
-
-
- Summary of Committee findings
-
- Major finding: it is not possible to reach a definitive
conclusion about the origins of the _Bacillus anthracis_ in the mailings
based on the available scientific evidence alone.
-
- S.1: The _B. anthracis_ in the letters was the Ames strain
and was not genetically engineered.
-
- S.2: Multiple distinct colony morphological types, or
morphotypes, of _B. anthracis_ Ames were present in the letters. Molecular
assays of specific genetic sequences associated with these morphotypes
provided an approach to determining relationships among evidentiary samples.
-
- S.3: The FBI created a repository of Ames strain _B.
anthracis_ samples and performed experiments to determine relationships
among the letter materials and the repository samples. The scientific link
between the letter material and flask number RMR-1029 is not as conclusive
as stated in the DOJ [Department of Justice] Investigative Summary.
-
- S.4: Silicon was present in the letter powders but there
was no evidence of intentional addition of silicon-based dispersants.
-
- S.5: It is difficult to draw conclusions about the amount
of time needed to prepare the spore material or the skill set required
of the perpetrator.
-
- S.6: Physicochemical and radiological experiments were
properly conducted to evaluate the samples for potential signatures connecting
them to a source but proved to be of limited forensic value.
-
- S.7: There was inconsistent evidence of _B. anthracis_
Ames DNA in environmental samples that were collected from an overseas
site. (Finding 3.4)
-
- S.8: There are other tools, methods, and approaches available
today for a scientific investigation like this one.
-
- S.9: Organizational structure and oversight are critical
aspects of a scientific investigation. The FBI generated an organizational
structure to accommodate the complexity of this case and received the advice
of prominent experts.
-
- S.10: A review should be conducted of the classified
materials that are relevant to the FBI's investigation of the 2001 _B.
anthracis_ mailings, including all of the data and material pertaining
to the overseas environmental sample collections. (Recommendation 3.1)
-
- S.11: The goals of forensic science and realistic expectations
and limitations regarding its use in the investigation of a biological
attack must be communicated to the public and policymakers with as much
clarity and detail as possible before, during, and after the investigation.
(Recommendation 3.2)
-
- Findings and recommendations ----------------------------
Finding 3.1: Over the course of the investigation, the FBI found and engaged
highly qualified experts in some areas. It benefited from the unprecedented
guidance of a high level group of agency directors and leading scientists.
The members of this group had top secret national security clearances,
met regularly over several years in a secure facility, and dealt with classified
materials. The NRC committee authoring this report, in keeping with a commitment
to make this report available to the public, did not see these materials.
-
- Finding 3.2: A clear organizational structure and process
to oversee the entire scientific investigation was not in place in 2001.
In 2003, the FBI created a new organizational unit (the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear [CBRN] Sciences Unit, sometimes referred to as
the Chemical Biological Science Unit, or CBSU) devoted to the investigation
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. The formation
of this new unit with clearer lines of authority is commendable.
-
- Finding 3.3: Investigators used reasonable approaches
in the early phase of the investigation to collect clinical and environmental
samples and to apply traditional microbiological methods to their analyses.
Yet during subsequent years, the investigators did not fully exploit molecular
methods to identify and characterize _B. anthracis_ directly in crime scene
environmental samples (without cultivation). Molecular methods offer greater
sensitivity and breadth of microbial detection and more precise identification
of microbial species and strains than do culture-based methods.
-
- Finding 3.4: There was inconsistent evidence of _B. anthracis_
Ames DNA in environmental samples that were collected from an overseas
site.
-
- Finding 3.5: As was done in the anthrax investigation,
at the outset of any future investigation the responsible agencies will
be aided by a scientific plan and decision tree that takes into account
the breadth of available physical and chemical analytical methods. The
plan will also need to allow for possible modification of existing methods
and for the development and validation of new methods (see Chapter 4, Section
12).
-
- ***Recommendation 3.1: A review should be conducted of
the classified materials that are relevant to the FBI's investigation of
the 2001 _B. anthracis_ mailings, including all of the data and material
pertaining to the overseas environmental sample collections.
-
- ***Recommendation 3.2: The goals of forensic science
and realistic expectations and limitations regarding its use in the investigation
of a biological attack must be communicated to the public and policymakers
with as much clarity and detail as possible before, during, and after the
investigation.
-
- Finding 4.1: The committee finds no scientific basis
on which to accurately estimate the amount of time or the specific skill
set needed to prepare the spore material contained in the letters. The
time might vary from as little as 2 to 3 days to as much as several months.
Given uncertainty about the methods used for preparation of the spore material,
the committee could reach no significant conclusions regarding the skill
set of the perpetrator.
-
- Finding 4.2: The physicochemical methods used primarily
by outside contractors early in the investigation were conducted properly.
-
- Finding 4.3: Although significant amounts of silicon
were found in the powders from the New York Post, Daschle, and Leahy letters,
no silicon was detected on the outside surface of spores where a dispersant
would reside. Instead, significant amounts of silicon were detected within
the spore coats of some samples. The bulk silicon content in the Leahy
letter matched the silicon content per spore measured by different techniques.
For the New York Post letter, however, there was a substantial difference
between the amount of silicon measured in bulk and that measured in individual
spores. No compelling explanation for this difference was provided to the
committee.
-
- Finding 4.4: Surrogate preparations of _B. anthracis_
did reproduce physical characteristics (purity, spore concentration, dispersibility)
of the letter samples, but did not reproduce the large amount of silicon
found in the coats of letter sample spores. [The committee appears to have
ignored how these significantly high levels of silicon within the spore
coat were achieved ... usually ascribed to the use of silanes ... and thus
where such a technical skill could be found. - Mod.MHJ]
-
- Finding 4.5: Radiocarbon dating of the Leahy letter material
indicates that it was produced after 1998.
-
- Finding 4.6: The flask designated RMR-1029 was not the
immediate, most proximate source of the letter material. If the letter
material did in fact derive from RMR-1029, then one or more separate growth
steps, using seed material from RMR-1029 followed by purification, would
have been necessary. Furthermore, the evidentiary material in the New York
letters had physical properties that were distinct from those of the material
in the Washington, DC letters.
-
- (Specifically) SEM-EDX measurements showed no silicon
in the coats of spores taken directly from RMR-1029, whereas the majority
of spores analyzed from the New York Post, Daschle, and Leahy letter materials
contained silicon in the coat. Based on recent studies of the mechanism
of silicon incorporation, silicon could have been incorporated in the coats
of the letter spores only if spores from RMR-1029 were subjected to one
or more subsequent growth steps. Another observation consistent with a
separate growth step was the detection of _B. subtilis_ in the New York
Post and Brokaw letter material but not in RMR-1029 (discussed in Chapter
5). The detection of meglumine and diatrizoate in RMR-1029 but not in the
Leahy and New York Post samples also is consistent with this finding; however,
it is not conclusive because it might have been possible to rinse these
impurities away without requiring later growth. Some of these findings,
as well as others, indicate that the New York letter materials were prepared
separately from the materials in the Washington, DC, letters. The presence
of _B. subtilis_ in the New York but not the Washington letter materials
and the different physical properties of the materials indicate that the
2 sets of letter materials were prepared separately.
-
- Finding 5.1: The dominant organism found in the letters
was correctly and efficiently identified as the Ames strain of _B. anthracis_.
The science performed on behalf of the FBI for the purpose of _Bacillus_
species and _B. anthracis_ strain identification was appropriate, properly
executed, and reflected the contemporary state of the art.
-
- Finding 5.2: The initial assessment of whether the _B.
anthracis_ Ames strain in the letters had undergone deliberate genetic
engineering or modification was timely and appropriate, though necessarily
incomplete. The genome sequences of the letter isolates that became available
later in the investigation strongly supported the FBI's conclusion that
the attack materials had not been genetically engineered.
-
- Finding 5.3: A distinct _Bacillus_ species, _B. subtilis_,
was a minor constituent of the New York Post and Brokaw (New York) letters,
and the strain found in these 2 letters was probably the same. _B. subtilis_
was not present in the Daschle and Leahy letters. The FBI investigated
this constituent of the New York letters and concluded, and the committee
concurs, that the _B. subtilis_ contaminant did not provide useful forensic
information. While this contaminant did not provide useful forensic information
in this case, the committee recognizes that such biological contaminants
could prove to be of forensic value in future cases and should be investigated
to their fullest. [The FBI downplayed their failure to identify a possible
source for this contaminant, a species frequently used as a stimulant and
therefore a potential institutional fingerprint as to where one set of
spores were cultured. - Mod.MHJ]
-
- Finding 5.4: Multiple colony morphotypes of _B. anthracis_
Ames were present in the material in each of the 3 letters that were examined
(New York Post, Leahy, and Daschle), and each of the phenotypic morphotypes
was found to represent one or more distinct genotypes.
-
- Finding 5.5: Specific molecular assays were developed
for some of the _B. anthracis_ Ames genotypes (those designated A1, A3,
D, and E) found in the letters. These assays provided a useful approach
for assessing possible relationships among the populations of _B. anthracis_
spores in the letters and in samples that were subsequently collected for
the FBI Repository (see also Chapter 6). However, more could have been
done to determine the performance characteristics of these assays. In addition,
the assays did not measure the relative abundance of the variant morphotype
mutations, which might have been valuable and could be important in future
investigations.
-
- Finding 5.6: The development and validation of the variant
morphotype mutation assays took a long time and slowed the investigation.
The committee recognizes that the genomic science used to analyze the forensic
markers identified in the colony morphotypes was a large-scale endeavor
and required the application of emerging science and technology. Although
the committee lauds and supports the effort dedicated to the development
of well-validated assays and procedures, looking toward the future, these
processes need to be more efficient.
-
- Finding 6.1: The FBI appropriately decided to establish
a repository of samples of the Ames strain of _B. anthracis_ then held
in various laboratories around the world. The repository samples would
be compared with the material found in the letters to determine whether
they might be the source of the letter materials. However, for a variety
of reasons, the repository was not optimal. For example, the instructions
provided in the subpoena issued to laboratories for preparing samples (that
is, the "subpoena protocol") were not precise enough to ensure
that the laboratories would follow a consistent procedure for producing
samples that would be most suitable for later comparisons. Such problems
with the repository required additional investigation and limit the strength
of the conclusions that can be drawn from comparisons of these samples
and the letter material.
-
- Finding 6.2: The results of the genetic analyses of the
repository samples were consistent with the finding that the spores in
the attack letters were derived from RMR-1029, but the analyses did not
definitively demonstrate such a relationship.
-
- Finding 6.3: Some of the mutations identified in the
spores of the attack letters and detected in RMR-1029 might have arisen
by parallel evolution rather than by derivation from RMR-1029. This possible
explanation of genetic similarity between spores in the letters and in
RMR-1029 was not rigorously explored during the course of the investigation,
further complicating the interpretation of the apparent association between
the _B. anthracis_ genotypes discovered in the attack letters and those
found in RMR-1029.
-
- Finding 6.4: The genetic evidence that a disputed sample
submitted by the suspect came from a source other than RMR-1029 was weaker
than stated in the Department of Justice, Amerithrax Investigative Summary.
-
- Finding 6.5: The scientific data generated by and on
behalf of the FBI provided leads as to a possible source of the anthrax
spores found in the attack letters, but these data alone did not rule out
other sources.
-
- Finding 6.6: Point mutations should have been used in
the screening of evidentiary samples.
-
- Finding 6.7: Biological material from all 4 letters should
have been examined to determine whether they each contained all 4 genetic
markers used in screening the repository samples.
-
- Finding 6.8: New scientific tools, methods, and insight
relevant to this investigation became available during its later years.
An important example is high-throughput "next-generation" DNA
sequencing. The application of these tools, methods, and insight might
clarify (strengthen or weaken) the inference of an association between
RMR-1029 and the spores in the attack letters. Such approaches will be
important for use in future cases.
-
- Finding 6.9: The FBI faced a difficult challenge in assembling
and annotating the repository of _B. anthracis_ Ames samples collected
for genetic analysis.
-
- Finding 6.10: The evidentiary material from this case
is, and will be, immensely valuable, especially in the event of future
work on either this case or other cases involving biological terrorism
or warfare. It is critically important to continue to preserve all remaining
evidentiary material and samples collected during the course of this (the
anthrax letters investigation) and future investigations, including the
overseas environmental samples, for possible additional studies.
-
- --
- Communicated by:
- ProMED-mail
- promed@promedmail.org
-
-
- In a word, the scientific evidence at this time does
not validate
- the FBI conclusions based on their circumstantial evidence
and in fact
- casts a wider net. For additional comments see
-
- http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2011/02/who-was-the-anthrax-attacker-s.html
-
- http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/02/study-questions-government-case-.html?etoc
-
- http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/15/panel-releasing-
- review-science-fbi-anthrax-probe/#ixzz1E4ZmvwhR
-
- and
-
- http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-and-justice-department-response-to-nas-
- review-of-scientific-approaches-used-during-the-investigation-of-the-2001-anthrax-letters
-
- - Mod.MHJ
-
-
- Patricia A. Doyle DVM, PhD Bus Admin, Tropical Agricultural
Economics Univ of West Indies Please visit my "Emerging Diseases"
message board at:http://www.emergingdisease.org/phpbb/index.php Also
my new website: http://drpdoyle.tripod.com/ Zhan le Devlesa tai
sastimasa Go with God and in Good Health
-
- Benjamin Franklin said, "They that
- can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve
- neither liberty nor safety."
|
