SIGHTINGS



EXCLUSIVE:
The Bay of Pigs -
What Really Went Wrong
By Gregory Burnham <monk13@san.rr.com>
10-11-99
 
 
 
 
Even though JFK was fully briefed about the Invasion of Cuba, the original plan which was approved by Eisenhower, was NOT the plan JFK inherited. The new plan was very different than the plan originally approved by Ike. Ike approved a small insurgency "team" (not "special ops" small, about 300) but small by comparison to the "brigade" it eventually became. The initial objective approved by Eisenhower only included a sustained "harassment campaign" in the form of sabotage, propaganda, and the like, but it did not involve any US MILITARY personnel or any US military hardware. It was designed as a "softening of the turf" mainly to destablize the Castro Regime to create fertile ground in which the seeds of rebellion could be planted among the populace.
 
Nixon's victory in the 1960 election was a forgone conclusion in the power structure's "collective mind" and his failure to defeat JFK was a crushing blow to the entire "military/industrial" complex's many plans;
 
The: "TAKE CUBA AT ALL COSTS NIXON PLAN" was known, and supported by, the intelligence community, the Pentagon, organized crime, the Vatican, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bildeberg's, the Royal Family, et al, but above all presumably by the White House!
 
Based on an absolute conviction that the next commander-in-chief would be the little Hitler: Richard M. Nixon, the military/industrial complex in conjunction with the intelligence community, began to organize and implement the Nixon Cuban Blitzkreig of April 1961...
 
When JFK beat NIXON the resultant effect on the Bay of Pigs plan caused the "players" to accelerate the building up of the Anti-Castro Cuban's invasion force to nearly 1,200 men, (3,000 all tolled), during the "lame duck" period between the election and the inauguration.
 
THAT is what JFK inherited.
 
JFK was fully aware of the restrictions imposed on the "commander in chief" prohibiting the use of ANY ACTIVE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL OR HARDWARE in clandestine or covert intelligence operations. In fact, ALL THE PLAYERS DURING OPERATION ZAPATA knew that law; they all knew Kennedy's firm commitment to abide by that law; and CIA's DD/Plans RICHARD BISSEL assured JFK that the plan was a "done deal, stroll through the park"-- where nothing could go wrong requiring direct U.S. military intervention. It was completely understood by all involved at the command level that U.S. Military intervention was NOT an option.
 
Although Castro's airforce was small, they did possess superior aircraft
 
over the brigade's B-26 bombers. Fletcher Prouty provided the agency with the "modified" B-26's each with six 50 caliber machine guns mounted in their noses. However, B-26's are bombers, not "jet" fighter aircraft. Castro's airforce was composed of about a dozen "non- jet" aircraft AND three T-33 "trainers" (which were more than "training aircraft"). The T-33's maneuverability would far out perform the modified B-26's because the American built T-33 is a "jet" aircraft.
 
Kennedy was aware of this imbalance in air superiority, and therefore he ordered that an operation be carried out and ONLY if successful was the brigade to proceed to the beach. The first operation was a partial success. Three of the modified B-26's departed from a CIA airfield in Peurto Cabezas, Nicaragua on SATURDAY to destroy the Cuban airforce while still on the ground in Havana. This operation was 80% successful as the anti-Castro Cuban pilots destroyed all of the aircraft while on the ground, which our U-2's had located earlier.
 
The problem occured when it was discovered that Castro's three T-33 "jet" aircraft had been moved south to Santiago prior to the air strike,
 
meaning they escaped destruction and remained a MAJOR threat to the success of Operation ZAPATA.
 
JFK's last order late SUNDAY afternoon (the day before the planned invasion) was clear:
 
OPERATION ZAPATA IS TO BE SCRUBBED (CANCELLED) if the T-33 jet aircraft have not been destroyed by a second airstrike he ordered for the following morning. "Before any troops are to land on the beach the T-33's must be neutralized."
 
The CIA officer in charge of the B-26's in Puerto Cabezas Nicaragua, Commander BARQUIN, called Fletcher Prouty at 1:00am and begged him for help, screaming that McGEORGE BUNDY had called and postponed the airstrike until AFTER the brigade had secured the beach AND a nearby AIRFIELD, saying: "Fletch you gotta do something, if these planes don't leave now the plan is going to fail..."
 
JFK had ordered no such thing. It was exactly the opposite of the attack plan that JFK had just ordered only hours earlier. But, at a crucial moment in time, McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special National Security Advisor postponed the pre-dawn airstrike.
 
Colonel Prouty could not counter-mand the order without the President's direct knowledge and approval since the "stupid order" had come from the President's own National Security Advisor, although unbeknownst to JFK!
 
DULLES could have awakened the president on a matter this critical, but Fletch could not reach him because DULLES was out of the country to give a lecture at a University in Puerto Rico-- (while "his" own operation was underway!). CIA's Deputy Director/Plans, Richard Bissell was nowhere to be found, nor was CIA's, General Cabel.
 
Colonel Prouty's hands were tied. He called BARQUIN and advised him of the dilemma. Both men knew this "delay" was likely to result in disaster, but neither were in a position to overide the "chain of command" that had changed the initial "rules" of engagement.
 
By the time the B-26's were approaching the CUBAN coast, the brigade had already stormed the beach, and were quickly being trapped by Castro's forces, but worse yet, the three T-33 jets were airborne as the element of surprise had been lost. Castro's three T-33 jets downed all 16 (specially modified) B-26's, and sunk the 3 supply ships as well,
 
before strafing and further trapping the Anti Castro Brigade on the beach.
 
Now, CIA's Deputy Director General CABEL asked JFK for air cover. A ludicrous proposal, indeed. JFK refused. The rest is history...
 
GO_SECURE
 
Greg
 
BTW: HEMMING was in CUBA at the time and told me that in his opinion "even if KENNEDY had sent all the fighters from the ESSEX the operation would have failed anyway because it was not supposed to succeed..."
 
Sources: My father, Ret. Navy [Special Aid to President Harry S. Truman, The White House & the USS Williamsberg 1944-1952; and Special Assignment President Dwight D. Eisenhower 1952-1960, The White House and Camp David], Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty, Chief of Special Operations, the Pentagon; my uncles Pete, Vince, and Bobby, Ret. Coast Guard, Navy, and Army, respectively; Gerry Patrick Hemming, ex-CIA operative & Bay of Pigs survivor.





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